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Cause for Concern: Causation and  
Federal Securities Fraud 
Jill E. Fisch 
ABSTRACT: The Supreme Court’s decision in Dura Pharmaceuticals 
dramatically changed federal securities fraud litigation. The Dura decision 
itself said little, but counseled lower courts to fashion new requirements of 
causation and harm modeled upon common law tort principles. These 
instructions have led lower courts to craft a series of confusing and 
inconsistent decisions that incorporate little of the reasoning upon which the 
common law principles are based. 
This Article accepts the Dura challenge and examines both common law 
causation principles and their applicability to federal securities fraud. In so 
doing, the Article identifies the failure of the federal courts to confront 
properly the complex causation challenges presented by securities fraud and 
the extent to which common law approaches to multiple and indeterminate 
causation offer guidance. Common law causation analysis further 
highlights the critical issue of harm specification. The Article demonstrates 
how, from Basic to Dura, the Supreme Court has refused to address the 
issue of what constitutes an appropriate economic loss, despite the fact that 
this determination is a necessary predicate to formulating a causation 
requirement. The Article goes on to show how, in Basic, the Court shifted 
the nature of actionable harm and, in so doing, exacerbated the complexity 
of causation analysis. 
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Defining the appropriate harm involved in securities fraud is challenging. 
Drawing upon tort law principles, this Article considers several alternatives, 
including artificial price inflation, ex post stock price drop, and increased 
investment risk. The choice among these alternatives reflects policy 
judgments about the appropriate goals of private securities fraud litigation. 
In its final section, this Article considers current critiques of securities fraud 
litigation and demonstrates how these concerns should influence the scope of 
the private right of action. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In 2005, the U.S. Supreme Court considered the scope of the loss 
causation requirement in federal securities fraud litigation. In Dura 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo,1 the Court explained that, in formulating the 
causation requirement, the lower courts should look to the common law for 
guidance. As the Dura Court stated, the “traditional elements of causation 
and loss”2 are derived from “common-law deceit and misrepresentation 
actions.”3 
Three years later, the Supreme Court decided another case involving 
federal securities fraud. In Stoneridge Investment Partners, LLC v. Scientific-
Atlanta, Inc., the Court rejected a claim by investors against secondary 
defendants on the ground that the investors could not meet the reliance 
requirement.4 In so doing, the Court explicitly rejected an interpretation of 
the reliance requirement based on common law fraud. According to the 
Court: “Section 10(b) does not incorporate common-law fraud into federal 
law.”5 
Reliance and loss causation constitute two components of the causation 
requirement in federal securities fraud, a requirement that the lower courts 
have refined over many years based on common law tort principles.6 The 
very terms used by the federal courts in analyzing causation—“transaction 
causation” and “loss causation”—have their roots in the common law. 
Moreover, the incorporation of tort law into federal securities fraud extends 
beyond causation; most of the elements of federal securities fraud draw 
upon common law torts. Thus, with its two conflicting approaches, the Court 
has thrown into question a critical interpretive principle. 
Legal realists might point to Dura and Stoneridge as evidence that the 
Justices’ desired outcomes dominate principled legal analysis. Neither 
decision fully analyzes the common law principles at issue, yet both reach 
 
 1. Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336 (2005). 
 2. Id. at 346. 
 3. Id. at 343. Detailed causation analysis in common law fraud cases is quite limited. 
Complex questions of causation are more commonly found in negligence law. For example, 
Dura cites comment b to section 548A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, see id. at 344, which 
contains a brief discussion of legal causation in cases of fraudulent misrepresentation and notes 
the existence of conflicting authority as to the scope of the defendant’s responsibility. See 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 548A cmt. b (1977); id. § 548A reporter’s note (1981). 
 4. Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 761, 769 (2008) 
(“Petitioner . . . cannot show reliance upon any of respondents’ actions except in an indirect 
chain that we find too remote for liability.”). 
 5. Id. at 771. 
 6. Congress codified the loss causation requirement as part of the Private Securities 
Litigation Reform Act of 1995 without defining loss causation or evidencing any intention to 
depart from the existing judge-made definition. See Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 
1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, sec. 101(b), § 21D(b)(4), 109 Stat. 737, 747 (codified at 15 U.S.C.  
§ 78u-4(b)(4) (2000)). 
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the same policy outcome of restricting private litigation. In Dura, the Court 
drew upon tort law to reject the argument that artificial price inflation was 
sufficient to establish the plaintiffs’ loss. In Stoneridge, the Court rejected tort 
law in order to dismiss claims against defendants who had not made 
misstatements directly to investors. Yet, legal realism fails to do justice to an 
underlying tension in the scope of the private right of action for federal 
securities fraud—a tension that, this Article claims, is properly understood as 
the cause of the Court’s schizophrenia. Federal securities fraud is—at the 
same time—both like and unlike the common law torts upon which it is 
based. As a result, the nature of the claim and the policies it serves offer 
reasons both to reject and to embrace analogies to the common law. 
The context of the causation requirement highlights this tension. A 
careful analysis of the common law reveals two important issues that the 
courts’ causation analysis has not addressed. The first is the effect of 
multiple causal factors. The Supreme Court’s decision in Basic Inc. v. 
Levinson7 makes it critical to determine the effect of the fraud upon stock 
price, yet multiple nontortious factors also affect stock price. In considering 
the legal effect of these multiple causal factors, courts have failed to 
incorporate tort law principles that allocate responsibility in cases of 
indeterminate, duplicate, or overdetermined causation. 
The complex causation cases in tort law reveal a critical connection 
between causation and harm. Under the common law, tortious conduct is 
actionable only to the extent that it causes harm, and the plaintiff can 
recover only for harms resulting from the risk created by the tortious 
conduct. The causation requirement thus mediates between the defendant’s 
conduct and the plaintiff’s claimed injury, ensuring that there is a sufficient 
connection between the two to justify holding the defendant legally 
accountable. As a result, precise specification of the nature of the injury or 
harm is necessary. Harm specification has, however, received relatively little 
attention in the context of federal securities fraud. The Court’s decision in 
Basic dramatically reformed the nature of private securities fraud claims, 
shifting the nature of recoverable harm without considering the implications 
of this shift. Both Dura and Stoneridge reflect the fallout from that decision. 
This Article accepts the challenge posed by Dura and Stoneridge. The 
Article conducts the analysis referenced, but never actually performed, by 
the Supreme Court and applies common law tort principles to causation 
analysis in federal securities fraud. In so doing, the Article demonstrates that 
the federal courts have failed fully to utilize the extensive common law 
principles developed by tort theorists to address complex causation issues. 
The application of these principles requires a more careful specification of 
harm. As a result, this Article considers the question posed by the Dura 
Court: What constitutes an appropriate economic loss? 
 
 7. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988). 
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The extensive policy debate over private securities fraud litigation offers 
new reason to consider this question. Commentators have argued that the 
class action—the most common post-Basic form of private litigation—is 
largely ineffective in achieving either compensation of injured victims or 
deterrence of wrongful conduct, the traditional objectives of tort law. In 
light of these concerns, many critics have urged that private litigation be 
substantially reduced or eliminated. The Supreme Court’s recent causation 
analysis can be understood as an unarticulated response to those concerns. 
At the same time, Basic reflects a shift away from the traditional tort context 
in order to address broader issues of market protection. Ultimately, the 
applicability of common law principles and the appropriate scope of the 
causation requirement depend upon the extent to which this shift is 
defensible. 
The Article begins in Part II by briefly reviewing the causation 
requirement in federal securities fraud and its common law roots. In Part 
III, the Article examines causation in common law torts, including the 
analysis of complex causation questions. This analysis demonstrates the 
critical role of harm specification. In Part IV, the Article turns to that issue, 
exploring the Dura Court’s rejection of artificial price inflation as a legally 
actionable harm and considering possible alternatives. In so doing, the 
Article considers the crucial shift in recoverable harm effected by the Basic 
decision. Part V offers some thoughts on the broader policy question of the 
appropriate scope of the federal statutory remedy for securities fraud in 
light of market and other developments and demonstrates the 
interdependency between this question and the causation requirement. 
II. THE CAUSATION REQUIREMENT IN 10b-5 LITIGATION 
Although federal securities fraud is a statutory claim, it functions largely 
like a common law tort claim.8 The federal courts have recognized an 
implied private right of action under section 10(b) of the Securities 
Exchange Act9 and SEC Rule 10b-5,10 and have used federal common law to 
define the contours of the cause of action.11 Thus, the elements of a federal 
securities fraud claim, including the causation requirement, are largely 
judge-made law. In 1995, however, Congress codified the loss causation 
requirement.12 
 
 8. See Louis Loss, Commentary, The Assault on Securities Act Section 12(2), 105 HARV. L. REV. 
908, 910–11 (1992) (explaining how courts have “develop[ed] a new federal tort from section 
10(b) and rule 10b-5, . . . [and] invok[ed] Erie-resistant federal common law in order to invent 
appropriate qualifications of the new tort”). 
 9. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, § 10(b), 48 Stat. 881, 891 (codified as 
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2000)). 
 10. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2008). 
 11. See supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
 12. See supra note 6. 
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Causation analysis has grown in importance. Twice in the last several 
years, the causation requirement has made its way to the Supreme Court. In 
2005, the Court addressed loss causation in Dura.13 Last term, the Court 
increased the significance of reliance in Stoneridge.14 Notwithstanding this 
attention, the parameters of the causation requirement remain unclear. 
A. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE CAUSATION REQUIREMENT 
The Second Circuit’s 1974 decision in Schlick v. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp.15 
is widely cited as the first case to formalize the causation requirement.16 In 
fact, several earlier cases drew upon principles of common law tort to 
articulate a requirement of reliance and/or causation in fact.17 List v. 
Fashion Park, Inc., for example, used the substantial-factor test of the 
Restatement of Torts in defining the reliance requirement.18 
Schlick, however, is credited with establishing the causation requirement 
because the court originated the causation terminology that is now in 
widespread use.19 The court—citing almost no authority—explained that 
causation consists of two distinct components: “loss causation” and 
“transaction causation.”20 Loss causation requires the plaintiff to show “that 
the misrepresentations or omissions caused the economic harm.”21 
Transaction causation involves showing “that the violations in question 
caused the [plaintiff] to engage in the transaction in question.”22 
Subsequent courts have analogized loss causation to proximate or legal 
 
 13. Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336 (2005). 
 14. Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 761 (2008). 
 15. Schlick v. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp., 507 F.2d 374 (2d Cir. 1974). 
 16. See, e.g., Weisberg v. Coastal States Gas Corp., 609 F.2d 650, 654 n.2 (2d Cir. 1979) 
(“The term ‘transaction causation’ was apparently first used in this court by Judge Oakes in 
Schlick . . . .”); David S. Escoffery, Note, A Winning Approach to Loss Causation Under Rule 10b-5 in 
Light of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (“PSLRA”), 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1781, 
1793 (2000) (“Schlick v. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp. was the first case to ever make a distinction 
between transaction causation and loss causation.” (footnote omitted)). 
 17. See, e.g., List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 463 (2d Cir. 1965) (“Our examination 
of the authorities satisfies us that [the common law reliance] requirement also is carried over 
into civil suits under Rule 10b-5.”). 
 18. Id. at 462 (quoting RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 546 (1938)); see also infra notes 148–49 
and accompanying text (discussing the substantial-factor test). 
 19. See Escoffery, supra note 16, at 1793 (attributing this terminology to the court in 
Schlick). 
 20. Schlick, 507 F.2d at 380. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. Significantly, Judge Frankel wrote separately to question the majority’s decision to 
employ these terms, observing that although they had “some scholarly currency,” their use was 
unnecessary and the implications of employing them were “still uncertain.” Id. at 384 (Frankel, 
J., concurring). 
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cause, while they analogize transaction causation to “but-for” or factual 
cause.23 
Significantly, the Schlick opinion addressed only the sufficiency of the 
pleadings.24 In addition, the Schlick court viewed transaction causation as the 
more demanding aspect of the causation requirement.25 The court did not 
explore the concept of loss causation in detail, concluding simply that it was 
“demonstrated rather easily by proof of some form of economic damage.”26 
Finally, in keeping with earlier causation decisions, Schlick specifically 
distinguished the causation requirement in the securities fraud context from 
its tort law predecessor, concluding that a strict causation requirement was 
inappropriate in light of the “broad remedial purposes” of the federal 
securities laws.27 
For a number of years, reliance—now termed “transaction causation”—
received more attention in securities fraud cases than did loss causation. 
Analogizing to common law fraud, courts required plaintiffs to establish 
transaction causation by proving actual reliance.28 This requirement 
presented a challenge because plaintiffs essentially had to show that  
they would have behaved differently as a result of information that they  
did not actually have. The requirement was particularly burdensome in 
nondisclosure cases. The Supreme Court addressed the issue in Affiliated Ute 
Citizens v. United States and determined that plaintiffs could establish reliance 
in such cases by proof of materiality.29 
The Affiliated Ute decision greatly simplified the reliance analysis in 
subsequent omissions cases. For example, in Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, 
Fenner & Smith, Inc., the Second Circuit explicitly rejected the defendant’s 
argument that “it is still necessary to show a ‘connection’ between 
defendants’ non-disclosure conduct and plaintiffs’ purchase of [the] stock—
in the sense that the former induced the latter—before a Rule 10b-5 claim 
 
 23. See, e.g., Berckeley Inv. Group, Ltd. v. Colkitt, 455 F.3d 195, 222 (3d Cir. 2006) (stating 
that loss causation is “[s]imilar to the concept of proximate cause in the tort context”); AUSA 
Life Ins. Co. v. Ernst & Young, 206 F.3d 202, 228–29 (2d Cir. 2000) (Winter, C.J., dissenting) 
(describing transaction causation as “whether the fraud here was a but-for cause of appellants’ 
losses”). It is not clear that this formulation is consistent with the original tort law conception. 
See infra Part III (discussing causation under tort law); see also W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER 
AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 42, at 273 (5th ed. 1984) (arguing that proximate cause 
deals with the question of legal responsibility and, as such, is “not a question of causation, or 
even a question of fact”). 
 24. See Schlick, 507 F.2d at 376 (noting that the appeal was from a complaint dismissal). 
 25. Id. at 380. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. at 383 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 28. See Theresa A. Gabaldon, Unclean Hands and Self-Inflicted Wounds: The Significance of 
Plaintiff Conduct in Actions for Misrepresentation Under Rule 10b-5, 71 MINN. L. REV. 317, 320–21 
(1986) (describing the actual-reliance requirement). 
 29. Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 153–54 (1972). 
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can be established.”30 Rather, the court concluded that “the requisite 
element of causation in fact has been established by the admitted 
withholding by defendants of material inside information which they were 
under an obligation to disclose.”31 
Affiliated Ute did not go far enough, however. The reliance requirement 
continued to serve as an obstacle. In part, the problem was that reliance was 
an individualized question that prevented the use of the class action 
mechanism. At the same time, the requirement was in tension with the 
nature of market transactions in publicly traded securities, because 
individual investors did not engage in face-to-face transactions with 
fraudsters, and fraudulent statements were often intermediated through 
brokers, research analysts, and the media before reaching the investing 
public.32 
Ultimately, the Supreme Court addressed these concerns in Basic Inc. v. 
Levinson.33 In Basic, the Court accepted the fraud-on-the-market (“FOTM”) 
theory as creating a rebuttable presumption of reliance when “materially 
misleading statements have been disseminated into an impersonal, well-
developed market for securities.”34 Importantly, the Basic Court 
distinguished federal securities fraud from common law fraud in its analysis 
of the reliance requirement, concluding that in securities cases—unlike in 
traditional face-to-face transactions—“‘the market is interposed between 
seller and buyer and, ideally, transmits information to the investor in the 
processed form of a market price.’”35 Accordingly, the Court concluded that 
investors could establish reliance by proof that they relied on the integrity of 
the market price rather than on the fraudulent statements themselves, and 
that it was sufficient, for purposes of the reliance requirement, for plaintiffs 
to establish that the fraudulent statements distorted the market price.36 
Basic dramatically facilitated the use of class action litigation in 
securities fraud cases. In turn, this development changed the economics of 
securities fraud litigation. Class action suits made it economically feasible to 
bring claims on behalf of small investors, and the aggregated claims were, in 
some cases, very large.37 Large claims offered a basis for higher attorneys’ 
 
 30. Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228, 239–40 (2d Cir. 
1974). 
 31. Id. at 240. 
 32. See, e.g., Panzirer v. Wolf, 663 F.2d 365, 366–67 (2d Cir. 1981) (describing claims by an 
investor who did not read the fraudulent annual report but instead based her investment 
decision on a Wall Street Journal column’s report of analyst opinions). 
 33. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988). 
 34. Id. at 247. 
 35. Id. at 243–44 (quoting In re LTV Sec. Litig., 88 F.R.D. 134, 143 (N.D. Tex. 1980)). 
 36. See id. at 245–47. 
 37. See, e.g., A.C. Pritchard, Markets as Monitors: A Proposal to Replace Class Actions with 
Exchanges as Securities Fraud Enforcers, 85 VA. L. REV. 925, 948 (1999) (“[T]he presumption in fact 
produced an enormous increase in liability exposure for corporate issuers. . . . Under the fraud 
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fees, motivating entrepreneurial lawyers to specialize in securities fraud 
litigation.38 Even weak cases often settled because of the high costs of 
defending the case, and these settlements created an incentive for some 
lawyers to file fraud complaints predicated on little more than an issuer’s 
disclosure of negative information coupled with a drop in the stock price.39 
The perception that some lawyers frequently used class actions to bring 
frivolous cases solely for their settlement value led to concerns about 
litigation abuse and demands for reform. 
One consequence of these concerns was increased judicial attention to 
the element of loss causation. If Basic had opened the litigation floodgates 
by relaxing the reliance requirement, perhaps courts could use loss 
causation to close them. Lower courts struggled with both the terminology 
and the parameters of the loss causation requirement.40 The starting point 
was to distinguish the two components of causation. In so doing, many 
courts41 cited the illustration offered by the Fifth Circuit in Huddleston v. 
Herman & MacLean: 
For example, an investor might purchase stock in a shipping 
venture involving a single vessel in reliance on a misrepresentation 
that the vessel had a certain capacity when in fact it had less 
capacity than was represented in the prospectus. However, the 
prospectus does disclose truthfully that the vessel will not  
be insured. One week after the investment the vessel sinks as a 
result of a casualty and the stock becomes worthless. In  
such circumstances, a fact-finder might conclude that the 
misrepresentation was material and relied upon by the investor but 
that it did not cause the loss.42 
Although the example is cogent, the basis for incorporating these two 
requirements into federal securities fraud is unclear. The Huddleston 
 
on the market presumption, typical damages exposure will be in the tens or hundreds of 
millions of dollars.”). 
 38. See generally John C. Coffee, Jr., The Regulation of Entrepreneurial Litigation: Balancing 
Fairness and Efficiency in the Large Class Action, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 877 (1987) (describing the role 
of entrepreneurial plaintiffs’ lawyers). 
 39. See Joel Seligman, Commentary, The Merits Do Matter: A Comment on Professor Grundfest’s 
“Disimplying Private Rights of Action Under the Federal Securities Laws: The Commission’s 
Authority,” 108 HARV. L. REV. 438, 442–45 (1994) (describing congressional testimony about 
securities fraud litigation premised on a drop in stock price). 
 40. See, e.g., Bastian v. Petren Res. Corp., 892 F.2d 680, 685 (7th Cir. 1990) (Posner, J.) 
(describing “loss causation” as “an exotic name—perhaps an unhappy one”); LHLC Corp. v. 
Cluett, Peabody & Co., 842 F.2d 928, 931 (7th Cir. 1988) (Easterbrook, J.) (describing the terms 
“loss causation” and “transaction causation” as “ungainly” and “confusing”). 
 41. See, e.g., In re Wash. Pub. Power Supply Sys. Sec. Litig., 650 F. Supp. 1346, 1353–54 
(W.D. Wash. 1986). 
 42. Huddleston v. Herman & MacLean, 640 F.2d 534, 549 n.25 (5th Cir. Unit A Mar. 
1981), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 459 U.S. 375 (1983). 
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decision expressly analogized to common law tort principles—explaining 
that reliance is “a type of ‘but for’ requirement” and that causation involves 
“proximate cause.”43 The only authority it cited for incorporating a distinct 
loss causation requirement into a federal securities fraud claim, however, 
was the dissenting opinion of Judge Meskill in Marbury Management, Inc. v. 
Kohn.44 Judge Meskill cited to common law tort authorities—Prosser on Torts 
and the Restatement (Second) of Torts (“Second Restatement”)—in support of his 
analysis.45 The majority in Marbury Management, however, rejected Judge 
Meskill’s analysis. The majority explained that “[d]ifferentiating transaction 
causation from loss causation can be a helpful analytical procedure only so 
long as it does not become a new rule effectively limiting recovery for 
fraudulently induced securities transactions to instances of fraudulent 
representations about the value characteristics of the securities dealt in.”46 
Recent decisions have favored Judge Meskill’s analysis and the Huddleston 
distinction over the approach of the Marbury Management majority.47 
Responding to policy concerns over excessive litigation, the courts 
invigorated the loss causation requirement. Opinions describe this 
requirement in various ways, most of which borrow both conceptually and 
linguistically from tort law.48 The stricter formulations emphasize loss 
causation’s foundation in the tort law requirement of proximate cause. 
These approaches require the plaintiff to show that the defendant’s fraud 
caused the loss “‘in some reasonably direct, or proximate, way’”49 or that 
“the subject of the fraudulent statement or omission was the cause of the 
actual loss suffered.”50 Other approaches are more policy-oriented. The 
“materialization of the risk” approach, for example, requires the plaintiff to 
prove that his loss “was caused by the materialization of a risk that was not 
disclosed because of the defendant’s fraud.”51 The Fifth Circuit explained in 
Huddleston that loss causation is established “only if the misrepresentation 
 
 43. Id. at 549. 
 44. See id. (citing Marbury Mgmt., Inc. v. Kohn, 629 F.2d 705, 718 (2d Cir. 1980) (Meskill, 
J., dissenting)). 
 45. Marbury Mgmt., 629 F.2d at 718–19 (Meskill, J., dissenting). 
 46. Id. at 710 n.3 (majority opinion). 
 47. See, e.g., Currie v. Cayman Res. Corp., 835 F.2d 780, 785 (11th Cir. 1988) (citing 
Huddleston and Judge Meskill’s dissent in Marbury Management in explaining the loss causation 
requirement). 
 48. Although some commentators have characterized these formulations as distinct tests, 
such a characterization may be misleading in that courts have frequently shifted from one 
formulation to another within the contours of the same opinion. 
 49. Robbins v. Koger Props., Inc., 116 F.3d 1441, 1447 (11th Cir. 1997) (quoting 
Huddleston, 640 F.2d at 549). 
 50. Suez Equity Investors, L.P. v. Toronto-Dominion Bank, 250 F.3d 87, 95 (2d Cir. 2001). 
 51. Id. at 98 n.1 (describing this approach—which is employed by the Seventh Circuit—as 
“both principled and predictable,” but concluding that prior Second Circuit precedents barred 
its adoption). 
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touches upon the reasons for the investment’s decline in value.”52 Similarly, 
some courts have looked to whether the loss suffered was a foreseeable 
result of the defendant’s fraudulent conduct.53 
Loss causation analysis complicates securities fraud litigation because of 
the myriad factors that affect the value of securities investments. The analysis 
depends, in part, on how the plaintiff’s loss is measured, an issue that this 
Article considers in more detail in Part IV below. Prior to Dura, some courts 
recognized artificial price inflation—the amount by which plaintiffs 
overpaid for securities, the price of which had been inflated by fraud—as an 
actionable loss.54 Expert witnesses offered testimony as to the effect of the 
fraud on the purchase price—the amount by which the defendants’ fraud 
had caused the plaintiffs to overpay.55 An alternative formulation of the loss 
looked to the amount by which the stock price dropped when the fraud was 
revealed to the market.56 This approach complicated the analysis because 
many nonfraudulent events impacted the stock price between the 
misstatement and the corrective disclosure, requiring the court to ascertain 
the extent to which a subsequent decline in stock price resulted from the 
fraud as opposed to other factors.57 
Congress’s decision to codify the loss causation requirement in the 
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (“PSLRA”) endorsed, and 
perhaps enhanced, judicial development of the loss causation 
requirement.58 The PSLRA was the result of a multi-year effort to reduce 
 
 52. Huddleston, 640 F.2d at 549. 
 53. See, e.g., Citibank, N.A. v. K-H Corp., 968 F.2d 1489, 1495 (2d Cir. 1992) (stating that 
the plaintiff’s economic harm must be “a foreseeable consequence of the misrepresentation”). 
 54. Indeed, the Ninth Circuit took this approach in Dura. See Broudo v. Dura Pharms., 
Inc., 339 F.3d 933, 937–39 (9th Cir. 2003), rev’d, 544 U.S. 336 (2005). 
 55. See Jay W. Eisenhofer et al., Securities Fraud, Stock Price Valuation, and Loss Causation: 
Toward a Corporate Finance-Based Theory of Loss Causation, 59 BUS. LAW. 1419, 1434–37 (2004) 
(describing the calculation of damages based on artificial price inflation). 
 56. See, e.g., Robbins v. Koger Props., Inc., 116 F.3d 1441, 1448 (11th Cir. 1997) (“[A] 
showing of price inflation . . . does not satisfy the loss causation requirement. . . . Our decisions 
explicitly require proof of a causal connection between the misrepresentation and the 
investment’s subsequent decline in value.”); Eisenhofer et al., supra note 55, at 1431–34 
(describing calculation of damages based on the decline in stock price after disclosure of the 
fraud). 
 57. See, e.g., In re Merrill Lynch & Co. Research Reports Sec. Litig., 273 F. Supp. 2d 351, 
364–65 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (describing intervening factors that may constitute alternative causes of 
stock price decline, such as recession, industry decline, and other marketwide phenomena), 
aff’d sub nom. Lentell v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 396 F.3d 161 (2d Cir. 2005); see also Castellano v. 
Young & Rubicam, Inc., 257 F.3d 171, 189 (2d Cir. 2001) (“‘[W]hen factors other than the 
defendant’s fraud are an intervening direct cause of a plaintiff’s injury, that same injury cannot 
be said to have occurred by reason of the defendant’s actions.’” (quoting First Nationwide Bank 
v. Gelt Funding Corp., 27 F.3d 763, 769 (2d Cir. 1994))). 
 58. See supra note 6. 
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abusive and frivolous securities fraud litigation.59 Among the features of the 
statute were a heightened pleading requirement for scienter; an effort to 
eliminate lawyer-driven litigation and the so-called race to the courthouse 
by, among other things, establishing a statutory lead plaintiff; and the 
replacement of joint and several liability with proportionate liability for 
secondary defendants.60 With respect to loss causation, the PSLRA added 
section 21D(b)(4) to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.61 The section 
provides that “the plaintiff shall have the burden of proving that the act or 
omission of the defendant alleged to violate this chapter caused the loss for 
which the plaintiff seeks to recover damages.”62 
Although the legislative history of the PSLRA is extensive, the legislative 
record provides far greater detail on the nature and extent of the perceived 
problem that the statute addressed than on the intended operation of the 
statutory solutions.63 It is clear that Congress intended, in section 
21D(b)(4), to codify some version of the loss causation requirement that the 
courts had previously developed and, through that requirement, to provide 
a limiting principle for calculation of the plaintiff’s losses.64 Congress also 
clarified that loss causation was a required element of the plaintiff’s case, as 
opposed to an affirmative defense for which the defendant would bear the 
burden of proof.65 Congress did not, however, elaborate on the nature of 
the loss causation requirement.66 
 
 59. The statute had its origins in the Republican Contract with America, which targeted 
excesses in litigation. See CONTRACT WITH AMERICA: THE BOLD PLAN BY REP. NEWT GINGRICH, 
REP. DICK ARMEY, AND THE HOUSE REPUBLICANS TO CHANGE THE NATION 143–55 (Ed Gillespie & 
Bob Schellhas eds., 1994) (describing problems caused by attorney control of litigation 
process). For a brief summary of the history and scope of the PSLRA, see Jill E. Fisch, Class 
Action Reform: Lessons from Securities Litigation, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 533, 534–37 (1997); Escoffery, 
supra note 16, at 1810–12. 
 60. See Jill E. Fisch, The Scope of Private Securities Litigation: In Search of Liability Standards for 
Secondary Defendants, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1293, 1304 (1999) (describing provisions of the 
PSLRA). 
 61. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, sec. 101(b),  
§ 21D(b)(4), 109 Stat. 737, 747 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(4) (2000)). 
 62. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(4). 
 63. Indeed, the ambiguous legislative history of the PSLRA led to considerable confusion, 
reflected most prominently in cases dealing with the heightened pleading requirement. See, e.g., 
Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 127 S. Ct. 2499, 2509 (2007) (noting divergence 
among lower courts regarding the meaning of the PSLRA’s term “strong inference”); E. Powell 
Miller, The Supreme Court’s Decision in Tellabs: The Death Knell for Securities Fraud Class Actions? Not 
So Fast, MICH. B.J., Oct. 2007, at 40, 40–42 (describing approaches of the different circuits to the 
heightened pleading standard and Tellabs’s resolution of the issue). 
 64. Congress independently determined that a plaintiff’s recoverable loss was limited to 
the amount of his or her “actual damages.” See 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (“[N]o person . . . shall 
recover, through satisfaction of judgment in one or more actions, a total amount in excess of 
his actual damages on account of the act complained of.”). 
 65. Id. § 78u-4(b)(4) (“[T]he plaintiff shall have the burden of proving [loss causation].”). 
In contrast, the new causation provision under section 12 of the 1933 Act simply enables 
defendants to prove that their violations did not cause the plaintiffs’ damages. See id. § 77l(b) 
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B. THE DURA DECISION 
In 2005, the Supreme Court addressed the subject of loss causation in 
Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo.67 Because the Dura facts offer challenges 
for causation analysis, it is worth considering them in some detail despite the 
limited nature of the Court’s holding. The Dura litigation involved a series 
of developments with respect to two of Dura’s major products: Albuterol 
Spiros (“AlSpiros”) and Ceclor.68 AlSpiros, a delivery device for asthma 
medication, was undergoing FDA review during the class period.69 The 
plaintiffs claimed that Dura had issued several press releases falsely 
indicating satisfactory testing and development of AlSpiros.70 At the same 
time, Dura was publicly claiming rising sales of Ceclor, an antibiotic.71 In 
February 1998, Dura announced lower-than-expected earnings based on 
slow sales of Ceclor.72 Dura later revealed that sales of Ceclor had been 
declining for some time.73 Subsequently, in November 1998, Dura revealed 
that the FDA had failed to approve AlSpiros.74 At the time of the 
announcements about Ceclor, Dura’s stock price dropped dramatically.75 
Later, when Dura released the news about AlSpiros, its stock price dropped 
by 20% but then recovered.76 
 
(allowing a defendant to prove “that any portion or all of the amount recoverable . . . 
represents other than the depreciation in value of the subject security resulting from [the 
fraud]”). 
 66. The description of the loss causation requirement in the legislative history was 
consistent with the most liberal Ninth Circuit approach, which found it sufficient for the 
plaintiff to allege and prove merely that the defendant’s fraud artificially inflated the price of 
the securities. In describing the loss causation requirement, the Senate Report stated: 
[T]he plaintiff would have to prove that the price at which the plaintiff bought the 
stock was artificially inflated as the result of the misstatement or omission. The 
defendant would then have the opportunity to prove any mitigating circumstances, 
or that factors unrelated to the fraud contributed to the loss. 
S. REP. NO. 104-98, at 15 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 694. The House Conference 
Report contained the first sentence of this description, but not the second. H.R. REP. NO. 104-
369, at 41 (1995) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 740. 
 67. Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336 (2005). 
 68. Broudo v. Dura Pharms., Inc., 339 F.3d 933, 935 (9th Cir. 2003), rev’d, 544 U.S. 336 
(2005). 
 69. Id. at 935–36. 
 70. Id. at 935. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. at 936. 
 73. Broudo, 339 F.3d at 936. 
 74. Id. 
 75. See Patrick J. Coughlin et al., What’s Brewing in Dura v. Broudo? The Plaintiffs’ Attorneys 
Review the Supreme Court’s Opinion and Its Import for Securities-Fraud Litigation, 37 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 
1, 13 (2005) (“Dura’s stock price dropped 47% in a day, from a high of $39-1/8 on February 24 
to a low of $20-3/4 on February 25, on an unprecedented 32-million share trading volume. The 
stock tumbled another 40% in the ensuing months.” (footnote omitted)). 
 76. Id. 
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The Dura plaintiffs tried to establish loss causation by demonstrating 
that, at the time they purchased Dura stock, its price had been artificially 
inflated due to the defendant’s misrepresentations.77 Essentially, the 
plaintiffs argued that their damages consisted of overpayment at the time of 
the initial purchase. The Supreme Court granted certiorari on the narrow 
question of “[w]hether a securities fraud plaintiff invoking the fraud-on-the-
market theory must demonstrate loss causation by pleading and proving a 
causal connection between the alleged fraud and the investment’s 
subsequent decline in price.”78 
The Supreme Court did little more than answer that question in the 
affirmative, stating that a plaintiff must plead and prove “a causal 
connection between the [defendant’s] material misrepresentation and the 
[plaintiff’s economic] loss.”79 The Court rejected the plaintiffs’ claim that 
the purchase of Dura stock at an artificially inflated price was itself a legally 
cognizable injury. As the Court explained, an “‘artificially inflated purchase 
price’ is not itself a relevant economic loss.”80 
The Court offered several explanations for this conclusion. First, the 
Court reasoned that “as a matter of pure logic, at the moment the 
transaction takes place, the plaintiff has suffered no loss; the inflated 
purchase payment is offset by ownership of a share that at that instant 
possesses equivalent value.”81 The Court also noted that a later sale might, 
but does not inevitably, lead to a loss, depending on whether the sale price 
reflects the truth.82 Second, the Court explained that even if the plaintiff 
subsequently sells at a lower price, his loss may not have been caused by the 
defendant’s fraud.83 Rather, “that lower price may reflect, not the earlier 
misrepresentation, but changed economic circumstances, changed investor 
expectations, new industry-specific or firm-specific facts, conditions, or other 
events, which taken separately or together account for some or all of that 
lower price.”84 
The Dura opinion is perhaps most noteworthy for the limits of its 
analysis. Although the Court concluded that artificial price inflation is not 
an actionable harm, it did not explain what constitutes an appropriate 
economic loss, nor did it specify the nature of the required casual 
connection between the defendant’s fraud and that loss. Commentators 
 
 77. Id. at 10. 
 78. Brief for Petitioners at i, Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336 (2005) (No. 03-
932), available at http://supreme.lp.findlaw.com/supreme_court/briefs/03-932/03-932.mer. 
pet.pdf. 
 79. Dura, 544 U.S. at 342. 
 80. Id. at 347. 
 81. Id. at 342. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. at 342–43. 
 84. Dura, 544 U.S. at 343. 
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have speculated as to whether Dura leaves room for plaintiffs to recover in 
the absence of a stock price drop, whether defendants may effectively block 
recovery by preemptively or simultaneously disclosing unrelated negative 
information, and how Dura applies to investors who have engaged in 
multiple transactions during the class period.85 Lower court rulings have 
begun to address these questions. 
C. POST-DURA CASES 
Litigation over the causation requirement exploded in the wake of the 
Dura decision. As a practical matter, Dura established loss causation as the 
key gatekeeping mechanism for private securities fraud litigation. 
Challenges to a plaintiff’s claim of loss causation are typically litigated in 
response to a motion to dismiss or at the class certification stage, and the 
courts have required a detailed showing of the relationship between the 
fraudulent statements and the subsequent stock price drop. This showing 
usually takes the form of an event study prepared by an expert witness. 
Although Dura did not explicitly require a corrective disclosure,86 the 
loss causation analysis in most cases has focused on both the identification of 
an adequate corrective disclosure and expert testimony tying that corrective 
disclosure to a drop in stock price. In addition, the courts have 
overwhelmingly required that the expert analysis separate the impact of 
other market- and firm-specific factors from the effect of disclosures that 
directly relate to the subject matter of the original fraud.87 In other words, if 
multiple factors caused the stock price to drop, the expert testimony must 
demonstrate that the corrective disclosure is at least partially responsible for 
that drop. 
The lower courts vary in their descriptions of the plaintiff’s burden. The 
Fifth Circuit imposes perhaps the most demanding standard. In Oscar Private 
Equity Investments v. Allegiance Telecom, Inc., the Fifth Circuit held that the 
plaintiff has the burden of establishing loss causation in order to obtain class 
certification.88 The court merged the conceptually distinct elements of loss 
 
 85. See, e.g., Merritt B. Fox, After Dura: Causation in Fraud-on-the-Market Actions, 31 J. CORP. 
L. 829, 846–62 (2006) (questioning the scope of Dura and identifying unresolved issues). 
 86. See, e.g., Nursing Home Pension Fund v. Oracle Corp., No. C01-00988 MJJ, 2006 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 94470, at *35 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 20, 2006) (“[S]everal courts have recognized that 
Dura does not require a 10(b) plaintiff to identify a corrective disclosure in order to properly 
plead or prove loss causation.”). 
 87. See, e.g., In re Williams Sec. Litig., 496 F. Supp. 2d 1195, 1266 (N.D. Okla. 2007) 
(rejecting proffered expert testimony for failure “to differentiate between losses rooted in 
causes cognizable under loss causation doctrine, on one hand, and, on the other hand, losses 
attributable to industry-specific stresses, the meltdown in the telecommunications sector, and 
other negative developments unrelated to the alleged fraud”), aff’d sub nom. In re Williams Sec. 
Litig.—WCG Subclass, No. 07-5119, 2009 WL 388048 (10th Cir. Feb. 18, 2009). 
 88. Oscar Private Equity Invs. v. Allegiance Telecom, Inc., 487 F.3d 261, 269 (5th Cir. 
2007). 
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causation and reliance, concluding that proof of loss causation, by a 
preponderance of the evidence,89 is required to obtain the benefit of Basic’s 
presumption of reliance.90 In support of this conclusion, the court cited the 
in terrorem effect of class certification91 and noted that while the relationship 
between loss causation and reliance “is foremost an artifact of the common 
law’s influence on 10b-5 actions, . . . it persists for good reason.”92 The court 
went on to establish a rigorous test for loss causation, requiring plaintiffs to 
show that it was more probable than not that the corrective disclosure 
specifically linked to the original fraud, and not unrelated negative 
statements, caused a “‘significant amount’” of the stock price decline.93 
Other courts have refused to go as far. A number of courts have 
explicitly rejected Oscar’s holding that loss causation analysis must be 
incorporated into the class certification decision.94 Illustrative is In re Micron 
Technologies, Inc. Securities Litigation, in which the court stated that the Fifth 
Circuit’s decision in Oscar was based on a misreading of Basic.95 The court 
specifically found that the defendant has the burden, at the class 
certification stage, of “severing” the link between the misrepresentation and 
the drop in stock price, and that the defendant could not meet this burden 
by showing that other factors in addition to the fraud contributed to the 
 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. at 265. Oscar was not the first decision to reinvigorate the reliance requirement. In 
Hevesi v. Citigroup Inc., 366 F.3d 70 (2d Cir. 2004), the Second Circuit implied, albeit in dicta, 
that Basic’s presumption of reliance should be read narrowly. Hevesi involved a suit against 
research analysts, predicated on information uncovered by Eliot Spitzer’s high-profile 
investigation. The Hevesi court stated that the extension of the Basic presumption from 
statements of fact by issuers to statements of opinion by research analysts was a “novel” and 
“significant” issue that was “‘of fundamental importance to the development of the law of class 
actions.’” Id. at 80 (quoting In re Sumitomo Copper Litig., 262 F.3d 134, 140 (2d Cir. 2001)). 
 91. Oscar, 487 F.3d at 267. 
 92. Id. at 269 n.41. 
 93. Id. at 270 (quoting Greenberg v. Crossroads Sys., Inc., 364 F.3d 657, 666 (5th Cir. 
2004)); see also In re Williams Sec. Litig.—WCG Subclass, No. 07-5119, 2009 WL 388048, at *5 
(10th Cir. Feb. 18, 2009) (“The plaintiff bears the burden of showing that his losses were 
attributable to the revelation of the fraud and not the myriad other factors that affect a 
company’s stock price.”). Similarly, although at the summary judgment stage, the court in In re 
Omnicom Group, Inc. Securities Litigation granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment 
on the basis that the plaintiffs’ expert had disaggregated only some but not all of the allegedly 
confounding factors. In re Omnicom Group, Inc. Sec. Litig., 541 F. Supp. 2d 546, 554 (S.D.N.Y. 
2008). 
 94. See, e.g., In re Nature’s Sunshine Prods. Inc. Sec. Litig., 251 F.R.D. 656, 665 (D. Utah 
2008) (“Other courts have refused to follow Oscar . . . .”); Darquea v. Jarden Corp., No. 06 Civ. 
722(CLB), 2008 WL 622811, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 6, 2008) (explaining that Oscar’s standard “is 
limited to the Fifth Circuit”); Wagner v. Barrick Gold Corp., 251 F.R.D. 112, 118 (S.D.N.Y. 
2008) (explaining disagreement among lower courts on “‘the issue of whether loss causation 
must be established to trigger the fraud on the market presumption’” (quoting the defendants’ 
memorandum)). 
 95. In re Micron Techs., Inc. Sec. Litig., 247 F.R.D. 627, 634 (D. Idaho 2007) (“[Oscar’s] 
reading of Basic ignores a crucial footnote.”). 
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decline in the stock price.96 Other courts have agreed, reasoning that, so 
long as the pleadings raise disputed issues of fact, causation is a question 
properly left for the jury.97 
D. STONERIDGE 
Oscar reasserted a link between loss causation and reliance that earlier 
courts had disavowed. With this link, the Fifth Circuit extended the 
gatekeeping role of the loss causation requirement to cut back on the scope 
of Basic. Reliance too, it seemed, could narrow the scope of private securities 
litigation. The Supreme Court’s 2008 decision in Stoneridge Investment 
Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc.98 took this approach further. On its 
face, Stoneridge did not implicate causation or reliance. The question 
presented to the Supreme Court was the appropriate scope of “scheme 
liability.”99 Scheme liability is a pleading tool that plaintiffs developed in an 
effort to circumvent the Court’s 1994 holding in Central Bank of Denver, N.A. 
v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A.100 that section 10(b) does not provide a 
private right of action against those who aid and abet securities fraud.101 The 
court of appeals in Stoneridge, without discussing reliance or causation, held 
that Central Bank limited private liability to defendants who actually make 
fraudulent statements and that, to the extent the plaintiff’s claims of scheme 
 
 96. Id. at 634–35; see also Freeland v. Iridium World Commc’ns, Ltd., 545 F. Supp. 2d 59, 
80 (D.D.C. 2008) (“Loss causation is an affirmative defense and the risk of nonpersuasion is on 
[the defendant], not Plaintiffs.”). 
 97. See, e.g., Freeland, 545 F. Supp. 2d at 80 (holding that, where factual issues remained, 
loss causation determination was properly left for the jury); see also Exxon Co., U.S.A. v. Sofec, 
Inc., 517 U.S. 830, 840–41 (1996) (stating that proximate and superseding cause are usually 
issues for the jury); EP Medsystems, Inc. v. EchoCath, Inc., 235 F.3d 865, 884 (3d Cir. 2000) 
(stating that loss causation is a fact-intensive inquiry best resolved by the trier of fact). 
 98. Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 761 (2008). 
 99. See id. at 770–72 (addressing the plaintiffs’ “scheme liability” argument). 
 100. Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 177 
(1994). 
 101. The actual question presented in Stoneridge was: 
Whether this Court’s decision in Central Bank forecloses claims under § 10(b) of 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5(a) and (c) where Respondents 
engaged in their own deceptive conduct in transactions with a public corporation 
for the purpose and effect of creating a false appearance of material fact that 
enabled the publication of artificially inflated financial statements by the public 
corporation, but where Respondents themselves made no public statements 
concerning those transactions. 
Brief for Petitioner at i, Stoneridge, 128 S. Ct. 761 (No. 06-43) (citations omitted), available  
at http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2007/2007_06_43/briefs/petitioner/Brief%20for% 
20Petitioner%20Stoneridge%20Investment%20Partners,%20LLC.pdf. 
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liability attempted to extend liability further, they constituted no more than 
claims of aiding and abetting.102 
At the Supreme Court, the defendants, aided by the Solicitor 
General,103 argued that the reliance requirement precluded the plaintiffs’ 
claim. They reasoned that because the third-party defendants had failed to 
make any statements directly to the investing public, investors could not 
claim to have relied on the defendants’ conduct, even if such conduct was 
fraudulent.104 The Supreme Court accepted this argument, thereby 
endorsing a conscious-awareness version of reliance that is directly in 
tension with its holding in Basic.105 
The Supreme Court’s rejection of scheme liability was not surprising in 
light of its repeated and express hostility towards private securities fraud 
litigation, although the statutory text does not support its narrow reading of 
reliance.106 More surprising was its disavowal of the analogy to common law 
tort in order to reach this result. Despite its explicit reference to common 
law fraud in Dura just two and a half years earlier, the Court dismissively 
explained that not all common law fraud violates section 10(b).107 While 
that statement is certainly true, it does not provide a reason for rejecting 
common law interpretive principles in determining the scope of an element 
derived from the common law.108 At the same time, the Supreme Court 
 
 102. See Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLS v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc. (In re Charter Commc’ns, 
Inc., Sec. Litig.), 443 F.3d 987, 992 (8th Cir. 2006), aff’d sub nom. Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC 
v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 761 (2008). 
 103. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Affirmance at 18–25, 
Stoneridge, 128 S. Ct. 761 (No. 06-43) (arguing that there was an absence of reliance because the 
defendants’ conduct, although deceptive, only misled the issuer’s accountant and not the 
investing public). Interestingly, the government’s position on the Stoneridge case was the subject 
of an intense political battle. Originally, the SEC had asked the Solicitor General to file an 
amicus brief on behalf of the plaintiffs, defending scheme liability. The White House 
intervened and objected, directing the Solicitor General instead to file a brief on behalf of  
the defendants, which he did. See Press Release, Senator Chris Dodd, Chairman Dodd  
Expresses Disappointment with Administration Decision to Reject SEC Position in Stoneridge 
Case (Aug. 16, 2007), available at http://dodd.senate.gov/index.php?q=node/4011 (describing 
the political battle). 
 104. Brief for Respondents at 17–21, Stoneridge, 128 S. Ct. 761 (No. 06-43), available at 
http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2007/2007_06_43/briefs/respondent/Brief%20for% 
20Respondents%20Scientific-Atlanta,%20Inc.%20and%20Motorola,%20Inc..pdf. 
 105. See Stoneridge, 128 S. Ct. at 776 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 106. The text of section 10(b) expressly imposes liability on those who “directly or 
indirectly” engage in fraudulent or deceptive practices. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2000). 
 107. Stoneridge, 128 S. Ct. at 771 (“Section 10(b) does not incorporate common-law fraud 
into federal law.”). 
 108. Concededly, as Justice Stevens observed, it would have been more difficult for the 
Court to justify its decision in light of authority suggesting that the plaintiff’s reliance 
allegations satisfied the common law standard. Justice Stevens explained:  
The Restatement (Second) of Torts § 533 provides that “[t]he maker of a fraudulent 
misrepresentation is subject to liability . . . if the misrepresentation, although not 
made directly to the other, is made to a third person and the maker intends or has 
FISCH_FINAL 5/13/2009 10:37 AM 
CAUSATION AND FEDERAL SECURITIES FRAUD 829 
seemingly confirmed the relationship between reliance and causation forged 
by Oscar. As Justice Kennedy, writing for the Court, stated: “[R]eliance is tied 
to causation, leading to the inquiry whether [the defendants’] acts were 
immediate or remote to the injury.”109 The implications of this link in light 
of the tension between Basic and Stoneridge remain unclear. 
III. TORT LAW FOUNDATIONS OF THE CAUSATION REQUIREMENT 
The extent to which federal securities law should incorporate tort law 
principles is a difficult question. The Supreme Court has spoken to the issue 
on few occasions and has never engaged in a detailed analysis. In earlier 
cases, such as Basic, the Court warned against applying common law to 
restrict unduly the scope of the federal statutory claim. In Stoneridge, the 
Court took the opposite view, expressing concern that the common law 
would improperly expand the scope of liability. In neither of these cases, 
however, did the Supreme Court carefully examine the applicable common 
law principles. This Article now turns to those principles because, before 
deciding whether to incorporate common law principles, it is valuable to 
understand the precise scope of the common law rules. 
A. THE CAUSATION REQUIREMENT IN TORT LAW 
Although commentators have widely recognized that causation 
inquiries raise difficult philosophical questions110—most of which are 
beyond the scope of this Article—legal doctrine continues to rely heavily on 
causation analysis in a variety of contexts.111 As used in securities litigation, 
the causation requirement has its roots in tort law, specifically the law of 
 
reason to expect that its terms will be repeated or its substance communicated to the 
other.” 
Id. at 777 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (alterations in original) (internal citation omitted) (quoting 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 533 (1977)). 
 109. Id. at 770 (majority opinion). To the extent reliance is analogous to but-for causation, 
it is worth noting that the requirement that the defendants’ acts be immediate to the injury is 
not based upon common law tort principles. See infra Part III. 
 110. See, e.g., HERBERT A. SIMON, MODELS OF MAN 11 (1957) (describing “the generally 
unsavory epistemological status of the notion of causality”); Christopher Bernert, The Career of 
Causal Analysis in American Sociology, 34 BRIT. J. SOC. 230, 230 (1983) (“Few terms have suffered 
either the infamy or the taken-for-grantedness of ‘cause.’”); John DiNardo, Interesting Questions 
in Freakonomics, 45 J. ECON. LITERATURE 973, 978 (2007) (“[E]xcept for the very simplest 
phenomenon, it is rarely clear what constitutes a good answer to . . . a [causation] question.”). 
 111. See, e.g., Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 753 n.19 (1984) (identifying causation as a 
required component of Article III standing analysis); Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. 
v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 535–37 (1983) (analyzing proximate cause 
under the Clayton Act); Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 285–87 
(1977) (recognizing a but-for-causation requirement in a constitutional-tort case); Arthur 
Leavens, A Causation Approach to Criminal Omissions, 76 CAL. L. REV. 547, 562–72 (1988) 
(discussing the roles of but-for and proximate causation in criminal law). 
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negligence.112 Liability for negligence requires wrongful conduct, causation, 
and harm. Causation establishes a connection between the defendant’s 
conduct and the plaintiff’s harm.113 Tort law has used a variety of terms to 
describe various components of the causation inquiry, including “but-for 
cause,” “cause in fact,” “proximate cause,” “legal cause,” and more.114 The 
terms are generally meant to distinguish between factual and legal 
causation, although the line between the two is often blurred.115 
Factual causation, or cause in fact, is often equated with but-for 
causation. In describing factual causation, Prosser and Keeton explained: 
“The defendant’s conduct is a cause of the event if the event would not have 
occurred but for that conduct; conversely, the defendant’s conduct is not a 
cause of the event, if the event would have occurred without it.”116 The 
Restatement (Third) of Torts (“Third Restatement”) uses similar terminology to 
describe factual causation in historical terms, but it omits the 
counterfactual117: “Conduct is a factual cause of harm when the harm would 
not have occurred absent the conduct.”118 
Courts generally found factual causation necessary but not sufficient to 
impose liability for a defendant’s wrongful conduct. As a result, they 
developed the requirement of legal, or proximate, cause. The rationale for 
 
 112. Cf. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 33(b) (Proposed 
Final Draft No. 1, 2005) (“An actor who intentionally or recklessly causes physical harm is 
subject to liability for a broader range of harms than . . . if [he had] only act[ed] negligently.”); 
Tony Honoré, Necessary and Sufficient Conditions in Tort Law, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF 
TORT LAW 363, 370 (David G. Owen ed., 1995) (“[I]n cases of strict liability, where the 
wrongfulness of the defendant’s conduct is not in issue, there is no occasion to trace a causal 
path from wrongfulness to the plaintiff’s harm.”). But see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS  
§ 431 cmt. e (1965) (stating that the description of what constitutes legal cause in negligence 
cases is equally applicable in cases of intentional torts and strict liability); cf. RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 33(c) (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005) (“[A]n 
actor who intentionally or recklessly causes physical harm is not subject to liability for harm the 
risk of which was not increased by the actor’s intentional or reckless conduct.”). 
 113. The requirement that the defendant’s wrongful actions produce harm is fundamental 
to tort law. As the Seventh Circuit has explained, “punishing a person for an act that does no 
harm is not needed to deter harmful acts.” United States v. Johnson, 380 F.3d 1013, 1016 (7th 
Cir. 2004). More precisely, the injury requirement serves to distinguish tort law from criminal 
law. John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Unrealized Torts, 88 VA. L. REV. 1625, 1646 
(2002). 
 114. See Guido Calabresi, Concerning Cause and the Law of Torts: An Essay for Harry Kalven, Jr., 
43 U. CHI. L. REV. 69, 71 (1975) (describing the concept of a “causal link”). 
 115. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 26 reporters’ note, 
cmt. a (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005). 
 116. KEETON ET AL., supra note 23, § 41, at 266. 
 117. For an explanation of the use of counterfactuals in analyzing factual causation, see 
Robert N. Strassfeld, If . . . : Counterfactuals in the Law, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 339, 345–46 
(1992). 
 118. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 26 (Proposed Final Draft 
No.1, 2005); see also H.L.A. HART & TONY HONORÉ, CAUSATION IN THE LAW 109–29 (2d ed. 
1985) (formulating a description of but-for cause in terms of a “condition sine qua non”). 
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the proximate cause requirement is to limit the harms for which the 
defendant is legally responsible based on some conception of the 
appropriate scope of accountability.119 The Third Restatement states that “the 
term ‘proximate cause’ is a poor one to describe limits on the scope of 
liability,”120 and instead substitutes a concept of legal responsibility.121 
As Tony Honoré explains, the plaintiff must “show that the element that 
makes the conduct wrongful or creates the undue risk was relevant to the 
harmful outcome for which the law provides a remedy.”122 The Third 
Restatement incorporates this concept, limiting an actor’s liability to “those  
. . . harms that result from the risks that made the actor’s conduct 
tortious.”123 The comments term this the “risk standard.”124 Thus, the 
Restatement requires a precise specification of the nature of the plaintiff’s 
harm. As it explains, although a defendant might be negligent in entrusting 
a loaded shotgun to a nine-year-old child, if that child drops the shotgun on 
someone’s toe, rather than accidentally shooting them, the victim’s broken 
toe, albeit a harm, is not within the scope of the risk created by the 
defendant’s negligent conduct.125 The Restatement explains that this standard 
eliminates the need to conduct an analysis of proximate cause, because it 
offers an alternative mechanism to limit the harms for which the defendant 
is legally responsible.126 
 
 119. Many commentators therefore argue that proximate cause is not about causation at all 
but rather involves an analysis of the policy considerations affecting the scope of the 
defendant’s legal responsibility for the plaintiff’s injury. See Anna Burdeshaw Fretwell, Note, 
Clearing the Air: An Argument for a Federal Cause of Action to Provide an Adequate Remedy for Smokers 
Injured by Tobacco Companies, 31 GA. L. REV. 929, 943 n.72 (1997). These policy considerations 
may make the proximate cause inquiry appear unprincipled. Prosser and Keeton observe that: 
“Proximate cause,” in short, has been an extraordinarily changeable concept. 
“Having no integrated meaning of its own, its chameleon quality permits it to be 
substituted for any one of the elements of a negligence case when decision on that 
element becomes difficult. . . . No other formula . . . so nearly does the work of 
Aladdin’s lamp.” 
KEETON ET AL., supra note 23, § 42, at 276 (alterations in original) (quoting Leon Green, 
Proximate Cause in Texas Negligence Law, 28 TEX. L. REV. 471, 471–72 (1950)). 
 120. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 29 cmt. b (Proposed 
Final Draft No. 1, 2005). 
 121. See id. § 29. This concept is consistent with Prosser and Keeton’s description of 
proximate cause. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 23, § 42, at 272–73 (“Once it is established that 
the defendant’s conduct has in fact been one of the causes of the plaintiff's injury, there 
remains the question whether the defendant should be legally responsible for the injury.” 
(footnote omitted)). 
 122. Honoré, supra note 112, at 368. 
 123. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 29 (Proposed Final Draft 
No. 1, 2005). 
 124. Id. § 29 cmt. d. 
 125. Id. § 29 cmt. d, illus. 3. 
 126. See id. § 29 cmt. h (explaining that section 29 reverses the position taken by section 
281 of the Second Restatement, which made a person “who threatened harm to a legally 
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Common law fraud cases employ a somewhat different causation 
analysis.127 In cases involving fraud, the courts’ inquiry into causation is 
usually satisfied by proof of reliance, which courts view as establishing factual 
causation. Courts rarely consider proximate cause extensively.128 As David 
Robertson explains: “The rule of legal (proximate) cause (scope of 
responsibility) for intentional torts sweeps very broadly, almost to the full 
reach of factual causation.”129 In particular, the requirement in negligence 
cases that the plaintiff’s harm be an expectable or foreseeable consequence 
of the defendant’s actions does not apply to intentional torts.130 Although 
the Third Restatement does incorporate the negligence requirement that the 
defendant’s tortious conduct increase the risk of harm,131 in practice, few 
cases even consider something akin to a loss causation analysis.132 
There are several reasons to treat causation differently in intentional 
tort cases. First, in most intentional tort cases, the defendant’s wrongful 
conduct is closely linked—temporally and conceptually—to the plaintiff’s 
harm. Cases involving competing or multiple causal factors are relatively 
rare. Second, the required state of mind associated with an intentional tort 
makes it easier to view the defendant as morally blameworthy, leading courts 
 
cognizable interest of another liable for all harm to the other, regardless of whether the harm 
was different from the harms whose risk made the actor’s conduct tortious”). 
 127. Arguably, the causation requirement is further minimized in the criminal context. For 
example, Michael Moore notes that accomplice liability extends well beyond cases in which the 
accomplice can be said to have caused the harm, and explains the resulting scope of liability 
largely in terms of moral blameworthiness. See generally Michael S. Moore, Causing, Aiding, and 
the Superfluity of Accomplice Liability, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 395 (2007). Significantly, although a 
complete analysis of causation in criminal cases is beyond the scope of this Article, it is 
noteworthy that lower courts have cited Dura in requiring proof of loss causation for purposes 
of the damage calculation required by the criminal-sentencing guidelines. See, e.g., United 
States v. Olis, 429 F.3d 540, 546 (5th Cir. 2005) (applying methods of measuring civil damages 
as a “backdrop” to determining criminal responsibility). To the extent that causation analysis is 
different under the criminal law, this approach may be problematic. See Samuel W. Buell, 
Reforming Punishment of Financial Reporting Fraud, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 1611, 1628–38 (2007) 
(discussing the application of criminal-sentencing guidelines to cases involving accounting 
fraud at large publicly traded companies). 
 128. See, e.g., Seidel v. Greenberg, 260 A.2d 863, 873 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1969) 
(“[M]any of the limitations upon liability that are subsumed under the doctrine of ‘proximate 
cause’ . . . do not apply to intentional torts.” (quoting Tate v. Canonica, 5 Cal. Rptr. 28, 33 
(Dist. Ct. App. 1960)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 129. David W. Robertson, The Common Sense of Cause in Fact, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1765, 1773 n.30 
(1997). 
 130. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 33(a) (Proposed 
Final Draft No. 1, 2005) (“An actor who intentionally causes physical harm is subject to liability 
for that harm even if it was unlikely to occur.”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 435A 
(1965) (“A person who commits a tort against another for the purpose of causing a particular 
harm . . . is liable for such harm if it results, whether or not it is expectable . . . .”). 
 131. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 33 cmt. f (Proposed 
Final Draft No. 1, 2005). 
 132. See id. § 33 reporters’ note, cmt. f. 
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to express less concern about the scope of harm for which he or she is held 
accountable.133 Finally, imposing liability for intentional torts does not 
generally pose a risk of inefficient overdeterrence. 
The limited scope of the causation requirement in common law fraud 
does not mean that courts are wrong to impose a more rigorous 
requirement in federal securities fraud. Indeed, there may be a number of 
policy justifications for applying a stricter causation requirement under Rule 
10b-5. Nonetheless, courts should recognize in imposing any such 
requirement that it is being employed despite—not because of—the 
common law origins of the federal securities fraud claim. Part V of this 
Article considers whether courts should apply the more rigorous common 
law negligence principles to federal securities fraud. Before addressing that 
question, however, it is important to consider in more detail how the 
common law has addressed problems of complex causation and, in turn, the 
relationship between causation and harm. 
B. TORT LAW APPROACHES TO CAUSAL COMPLEXITY 
Cases involving multiple causal factors complicate the analysis of 
causation.134 Tort law recognizes the possibility of multiple tortfeasors, who 
can act either in concert or individually to cause a single harm. Complexity 
arises in situations in which the particular wrongdoer cannot be identified 
with certainty, as well as where the contributing causes of the plaintiff’s 
harm are different in kind, are separated in time or space, involve a mixture 
of wrongful and innocent actions, or include nonhuman elements such as 
forces of nature or acts of God. As the comments to section 34 of the Third 
Restatement recognize, early tort law was premised on a formalistic approach 
to causation based on the belief that cause could be determined through a 
“neutral, scientific inquiry.”135 This approach has become outdated.136 
 
 133. See, e.g., Russell D. Covey, The Unbearable Lightness of Batson: Mixed Motives and 
Discrimination in Jury Selection, 66 MD. L. REV. 279, 335–36 (2007) (“In intentional tort cases, the 
injury combined with the intent to cause it establish a sufficient equitable basis for liability as 
long as the actor’s conduct might be said to have contributed to the risk.”); Meredith J. 
Duncan, Criminal Malpractice: A Lawyer’s Holiday, 37 GA. L. REV. 1251, 1279 n.133 (2003) 
(“Because of the state of mind required to prove that a defendant is liable for an intentional 
tort, any intervening event, such as another person’s negligence, typically does not break the 
chain of causation between the defendant’s intentional act and any resulting harm . . . .”). 
 134. There is an extensive literature on the role of causation in tort law and, in particular, 
on cases involving multiple and overdetermined causation. The textual discussion in this 
Section cannot hope to consider all the nuances of that literature. For a sample, see generally 
HART & HONORÉ, supra note 118; Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 113; Michael D. Green, The 
Intersection of Factual Causation and Damages, 55 DEPAUL L. REV. 671 (2006); Symposium on 
Causation in the Law of Torts, 63 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 397 (1987); Richard W. Wright, Causation in 
Tort Law, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1735 (1985). 
 135. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 34 cmt. a (Proposed 
Final Draft No. 1, 2005). 
 136. Id. 
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Modern cases recognize the inevitability of multiple causal factors and the 
impracticality of attempting to identify a single factual or legal cause of a 
plaintiff’s harm. 
Modern tort law acknowledges “that there are always multiple causes of 
an outcome and that the existence of intervening causes does not ordinarily 
elide a prior actor’s liability.”137 Although the existence of multiple causes 
may reduce the defendant’s liability to some portion of the plaintiff’s harm, 
that issue is addressed through the allocation of damages, not by relieving 
the defendant of liability. More importantly, as discussed below, even when 
the presence of multiple causal factors makes it impossible to identify the 
defendant’s tortious conduct as a but-for cause of the plaintiff’s harm, 
common law courts have nonetheless imposed liability. 
Multiple causal factors may operate, in the tort context, in several ways. 
In some cases, tortious conduct causes harm in combination with another 
nontortious factor. An early example of this type of multiple causation was 
the series of “two fires” cases,138 in which, at the same time that a negligently 
set fire approached the plaintiff’s property, another fire (typically of non-
negligent or unknown origin) also approached.139 The combined effect of 
both fires destroyed the property, but because each fire was sufficient to 
destroy the property independently, neither could be identified as a but-for 
cause of the harm.140 
 
 137. Id. 
 138. The commonly cited “two fires” cases are Kingston v. Chicago & Northwestern Railway 
Co., 211 N.W. 913 (Wis. 1927), Anderson v. Minneapolis, St. Paul & Sault Ste. Marie Railway Co., 
179 N.W. 45 (Minn. 1920), and Cook v. Minneapolis, St. Paul & Sault Ste. Marie Railway Co., 74 
N.W. 561 (Wis. 1898). 
 139. For some reason, courts did not appear to have difficulty finding but-for causation 
when the two fires were both of negligent origin. See, e.g., Seckerson v. Sinclair, 140 N.W. 239, 
244 (N.D. 1913) (“[W]hen the wrong of two persons jointly contributes to the injury, both of 
such persons are liable.”). There was greater disagreement in the old cases about both the 
appropriate approach and the correct result when one fire was of non-negligent origin. Compare 
Anderson, 179 N.W. at 49 (applying the substantial-factor test to impose liability despite the 
absence of but-for causation), with Cook, 74 N.W. at 566 (“[W]here a cause set in motion by 
negligence, reaches to the result complained of in a line of responsible causation, and another 
cause, having no responsible origin, reaches it at the same time, so that what then takes place 
would happen as the effect of either cause, entirely regardless of the other, then the 
consequence cannot be said, with any degree of certainty, to relate to negligence as its 
antecedent; requisite intelligent causation necessary to legal liability is wanting, leaving no 
ground, in reason or in law, for it to rest upon.”). 
 140. See, e.g., Robert J. Peaslee, Multiple Causation and Damage, 47 HARV. L. REV. 1127, 1130 
(1934). Peaslee notes: 
[W]here one of the causes is innocent and the other culpable in origin, as of the 
two fires uniting before reaching and burning the plaintiff’s house, must the 
negligent actor pay the whole loss, or is he responsible for none of it? On the one 
hand is sufficient wrongful causation of a physical result, and on the other,  
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A modern example is litigation over lung cancer associated with 
asbestos exposure. Many plaintiffs who were exposed to asbestos and 
subsequently developed lung cancer also smoked cigarettes. While asbestos 
exposure is associated with a statistically significant increase in the likelihood 
of developing lung cancer, so is cigarette smoking.141 Therefore, as a 
practical matter, it is difficult to establish that the asbestos exposure, and not 
the cigarette smoking, is responsible for a particular victim’s disease.142 The 
issue is further complicated by scientific studies indicating that asbestos and 
cigarette smoking tend to work synergistically, multiplying the risk beyond 
that attributable to either factor alone.143 
Sometimes the problem is not that multiple causal factors combine, but 
that the plaintiff cannot isolate which of the multiple causal factors 
operating independently but in a similar fashion is responsible for the harm. 
An example is the classic torts case of Summers v. Tice.144 Tice was injured 
when two hunters negligently fired their guns, but it was impossible to 
establish which hunter hit him and, thus, which hunter’s negligence was a 
but-for cause of his injuries.145 A modern example is Sindell v. Abbott 
Laboratories.146 The plaintiffs were injured by the drug DES that one of the 
defendants manufactured, but the plaintiffs could not establish which 
defendant produced the product that resulted in their specific injuries.147 
 
inevitable loss not increased by the defendant’s wrong. Recovery would make the 
plaintiff better off than he would have been if the defendant had done no wrong. 
Id. 
 141. See Gerald W. Boston, A Mass-Exposure Model of Toxic Causation: The Content of Scientific 
Proof and the Regulatory Experience, 18 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 181, 299–301 (1993) (describing the 
challenge presented by combined asbestos exposure and cigarette smoking). 
 142. See, e.g., Brian M. DiMasi, Comment, The Threshold Level of Proof of Asbestos Causation: 
The “Frequency, Regularity and Proximity Test” and a Modified Summers v. Tice Theory of Burden-
Shifting, 24 CAP. U. L. REV. 735, 739 (1995) (explaining that many asbestos victims who smoke 
“are unable to prove the prima facie element of legal causation and are defeated by defendants’ 
motions for summary judgment”). 
 143. Deirdre A. McDonnell, Comment, Increased Risk of Disease Damages: Proportional Recovery 
as an Alternative to the All or Nothing System Exemplified by Asbestos Cases, 24 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 
623, 639 (1997) (“[T]he combination of asbestos exposure and cigarette smoking produces a 
synergistic effect that creates an extremely high chance of lung cancer.”). 
 144. Summers v. Tice, 199 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1948). 
 145. See id. at 1–3. 
 146. Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 607 P.2d 924 (Cal. 1980). 
 147. Id. at 936. Similarly, in Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Products Corp., the plaintiff was exposed, 
over a period of time, to asbestos manufactured by several defendants. Borel v. Fibreboard 
Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1094 (5th Cir. 1973). Because the effects of asbestos 
exposure are cumulative and take years to develop, the court found that “it is impossible, as a 
practical matter, to determine with absolute certainty which particular exposure to asbestos dust 
resulted in injury to Borel.” Id. Unlike Summers and Sindell, it was possible that, as a factual 
matter, all of the asbestos exposures had contributed to Borel’s injury, but like those cases, it 
was impossible for the court to determine factual causation with certainty. 
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To address these problems, the first two Restatements of Torts employed 
the “substantial-factor” test. Under this test, a defendant’s conduct was 
considered a cause of the plaintiff’s harm if such conduct was a substantial 
factor in bringing about the harm.148 So long as the defendant’s conduct was 
a substantial factor, the presence of other contributing factors did not 
relieve the defendant of liability. The Restatement (Second) of Torts noted: “If 
two forces are actively operating, one because of the actor’s negligence, the 
other not because of any misconduct on his part, and each of itself is 
sufficient to bring about harm to another, the actor’s negligence may be 
found to be a substantial factor in bringing it about.”149 
A weakness of the substantial-factor test was that it required factfinders 
to determine which contributing causes were legally significant, an approach 
that confuses the concepts of factual and legal causation. The Third 
Restatement seeks to cabin the factfinder’s discretion and prevent efforts to 
identify scientifically the “right” cause.150 Under the Third Restatement, 
tortious conduct must be a factual cause of the harm, which means that “the 
harm would not have occurred absent the conduct.”151 The Third Restatement 
deals with duplicative causation by providing that multiple sufficient causal 
factors are each “regarded as a factual cause of the harm.”152 As the 
Reporters’ Notes to the Third Restatement explain: “There is near-universal 
recognition of the inappropriateness of the but-for standard for factual 
causation when multiple sufficient causes exist.”153 Put differently, tort law 
imposes liability in cases of overdetermined causation “for the practical 
 
 148. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 431 (1965); see also id. § 433 (setting forth factors 
to consider in determining whether the defendant’s conduct was a substantial factor in 
bringing about the plaintiff’s harm). 
 149. Id. § 432(2). 
 150. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 26 reporters’ note, 
cmt. c (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005). This note states: 
[C]ommon understanding and usage often look for a single “responsible cause” 
and attribute an event to that unusual or extraordinary action or conduct. . . . This 
common usage may lead juries, lawyers, and courts astray in a case where two or 
more relevant events may have been actual causes of plaintiff’s harm. 
Id. 
 151. Id. § 26. 
 152. Id. § 27. This approach borrows heavily from the Necessary Element of a Sufficient Set 
(“NESS”) test advocated by Richard Wright. The NESS test “states that a particular condition 
was a cause of a specific consequence if and only if it was a necessary element of a set of 
antecedent actual conditions that was sufficient for the occurrence of the consequence.” 
Wright, supra note 134, at 1774. Wright grounded his test in a normative conception of the 
defendant’s responsibility. See id. at 1827 (describing the connection between the defendant’s 
legal responsibility and principles of corrective justice). The NESS test is particularly useful in 
solving the counterfactual problem posed by but-for causation—that is, teasing out the 
consequences that would have occurred in the absence of the defendant’s wrongful conduct. 
 153. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 27 reporters’ note,  
cmt. a (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005). 
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reason that tortious activity that produces harm would go unsanctioned 
otherwise.”154 
Rather than allocating responsibility through causation, the Restatements 
address the contributions of multiple causal factors, where appropriate, by 
apportioning damages. In some cases, it is possible to untangle the harms 
associated with multiple causal factors—allocating responsibility to each 
defendant for his or her proportionate share of the harm.155 In cases 
involving a single indivisible harm, this approach is impractical,156 and 
courts have devised alternatives.157 Either approach, however, requires a 
preexisting theory that explains why it is reasonable to attribute a specific 
share of responsibility to the defendant. In a smoking/asbestos case, for 
example, one could argue that the asbestos manufacturers’ responsibility 
should be reduced because of the smoking plaintiff’s comparative fault.158 
For this reason, apportionment of damages is more commonly applied in 
the negligence context, in which the law seeks to achieve an efficient level of 
deterrence by precisely tailoring liability. More importantly, as indicated 
above, these efforts are directed to the allocation of damages—courts have 
generally rejected the argument that these difficulties should preclude 
recovery.159 
 
 154. United States v. Johnson, 380 F.3d 1013, 1016 (7th Cir. 2004). 
 155. The Second Restatement provides: 
§ 433A. Apportionment of Harm to Causes 
(1) Damages for harm are to be apportioned among two or more causes where 
(a) there are distinct harms, or 
(b) there is a reasonable basis for determining the contribution of each 
cause to a single harm. 
(2) Damages for any other harm cannot be apportioned among two or more 
causes. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433A (1965). Allocation of damages among multiple 
tortfeasors is more complex under the Third Restatement. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: 
APPORTIONMENT OF LIAB. § 8 (2000) (allocating responsibility according to the “nature of 
[each] person’s risk-creating conduct” and “the strength of the causal connection between 
[such] conduct and the harm”). 
 156. See, e.g., Martin v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 528 A.2d 947, 950 (Pa. 1987) (citing 
expert testimony explaining that it was impossible to separate out the effects of asbestos 
exposure and smoking on the plaintiff’s pulmonary disability). 
 157. See, e.g., Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 607 P.2d 924, 937–38 (Cal. 1980) (imposing liability 
based on market share). 
 158. See, e.g., Brisboy v. Fibreboard Corp., 418 N.W.2d 650, 654–57 (Mich. 1988) (holding 
that an asbestos manufacturer’s liability for the plaintiff’s lung cancer should be reduced to 
reflect the plaintiff’s comparative fault for smoking cigarettes). 
 159. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIAB. § C18 (2000) (“If the 
independent tortious conduct of two or more persons is a legal cause of an indivisible injury, 
each person is jointly and severally liable for the recoverable damages caused by the tortious 
conduct, subject to the reallocation provision of § C21.”). As stated by Dean Prosser and Dean 
Keeton: 
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Causation analysis is further complicated when the multiple causal 
factors operate sequentially rather than simultaneously. Does the 
intervention of subsequent tortious (or innocent) conduct relieve an initial 
tortfeasor of responsibility? Does harm inflicted by an initial wrongdoer 
preempt a causal role for subsequent conduct? In many cases, the time 
period between the wrongful conduct and the injury is relatively short, but 
as the temporal and spatial separation between the two increases, it begins 
to seem less reasonable to impose liability. One way to avoid imposing 
liability is by identifying an alternative cause of the harm.160 
Courts have used terms such as “preemptive cause,” “superseding 
cause,” and “intervening cause” to address the sequential operation of 
multiple causal factors. Under the common law, not all intervening events 
relieve a tortfeasor of liability. Some courts use the term “superseding cause” 
to identify an intervening event that is sufficient to break the causal chain.161 
As the Minnesota Supreme Court explained: 
For an intervening cause to be considered a superseding cause, the 
intervening cause must satisfy four elements: 1) its harmful effects 
must have occurred after the original negligence; 2) it must not 
have been brought about by the original negligence; 3) it must 
have actively worked to bring about a result which would not 
otherwise have followed from the original negligence; and 4) it 
must not have been reasonably foreseeable by the original 
wrongdoer.162 
Even under this strict analysis, applying the doctrine of superseding 
cause in tort law is problematic from a policy perspective. Consider Richard 
Wright’s example of the defendant who shoots a person just as he is about to 
drink a cup of poisoned tea—or, even better, after the victim drinks the tea, 
but before the poison takes effect.163 Wright argues that the defendant’s 
 
Certain results, by their very nature, are obviously incapable of any reasonable or 
practical division. . . . No ingenuity can suggest anything more than a purely 
arbitrary apportionment of such harm. Where two or more causes combine to 
produce such a single result, incapable of any reasonable division, each may be a 
substantial factor in bringing about the loss, and if so, each is charged with all of it. 
KEETON ET AL., supra note 23, § 52, at 347. 
 160. See Michael S. Moore, The Metaphysics of Causal Intervention, 88 CAL. L. REV. 827, 875 
(2000) (“[C]ausation peters out over time, much as the ripples from a stone dropped in a pond 
diminish as they travel outward.”). 
 161. See, e.g., Harrington v. Regina Med. Ctr., No. A03-1566, 2004 Minn. App. LEXIS 913, at 
*9 (Minn. Ct. App. July 26, 2004). 
 162. Canada ex rel. Landy v. McCarthy, 567 N.W.2d 496, 507 (Minn. 1997). 
 163. See, e.g., Richard W. Wright, Once More into the Bramble Bush: Duty, Causal Contribution, 
and the Extent of Legal Responsibility, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1071, 1112–14 (2001) (describing some 
variations of the poisoned-tea example to distinguish duplicative from preemptive causation). 
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shot was a preemptive cause of the victim’s death.164 The poisoner has no 
more caused the victim’s death than a shooter who comes along afterwards 
and pumps bullets into the victim’s lifeless body.165 The poisoner’s actions, 
however, create a difficulty in establishing but-for causation with respect to 
the shooter. Because the victim would have died irrespective of the shooter’s 
actions, one can argue that the shooting was not a but-for cause of the 
death. The result is an untidy situation involving a dead victim and two 
tortfeasors who might, under some analyses, escape liability.166 
One way to address this untidiness is by redefining the harm. In 
Wright’s example, we might seek to hold the poisoner liable not for the 
victim’s death, but for the initial cell damage that had not yet resulted in 
physical symptoms. Dillon v. Twin State Gas & Electric Co.167 is an example of a 
court redefining the harm in the opposite direction in an effort to limit the 
defendant’s liability for conduct that arguably constituted a superseding 
cause of the harm. In Dillon, a child fell from a girder and grabbed a steel 
wire to catch himself.168 The electric current from the wire killed the child, 
but had he not been electrocuted, he likely would have fallen to his death.169 
In assessing the utility company’s liability for negligently failing to 
shield its wires, the Dillon court rejected the seemingly obvious finding that 
electrocution was the sole factual and legal cause of the child’s death. 
Instead, the court reconceptualized the nature of the harm, reasoning that, 
because the child would have fallen to his death anyway, the utility company 
was liable not for that death, but merely for any additional harm inflicted by 
the electrocution.170 The court’s analysis suggests (although obviously does 
not address) the possibility that, had a third party negligently caused the 
child to fall from the girder, the intervening electrocution would not have 
relieved that party of liability, despite the fact that electrocution was the sole 
factual cause of the child’s death. 
The idea that a tortfeasor’s liability may be determined by the 
happenstance intervention of another event seems problematic.171 Why 
 
 164. See id. 
 165. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 26 cmt. k (Proposed 
Final Draft No. 1, 2005) (“An act or omission cannot be a factual cause of an outcome that has 
already occurred.”). 
 166. See Alan Schwartz, Causation in Private Tort Law: A Comment on Kelman, 63 CHI.-KENT L. 
REV. 639, 646 n.20 (1987) (describing the result as “[un]acceptable to most observers because 
consequentialist reasons exist—to deter harm—that justify sanctioning both defendants”). 
 167. Dillon v. Twin State Gas & Elec. Co., 163 A. 111 (N.H. 1932). 
 168. Id. at 112. 
 169. Id. at 114. 
 170. See id. at 115 (“If it were found that he would have thus fallen with death probably 
resulting, the defendant would not be liable, unless for conscious suffering found to have been 
sustained from the shock.”). 
 171. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 27 reporters’ note, 
cmt. h (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005) (observing that the operation of the rules creates an 
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should the corporate executive who lies to investors at a time when the 
overall market is rising be held accountable, while another executive who 
lies just before a stock market crash escapes liability? Perhaps the problem is 
not in the analysis of causation, but in the definition of the harm. Dillon 
highlights the close relationship between causation and harm, a relationship 
that is reflected in the Third Restatement’s effort to allocate legal 
responsibility through apportionment of damages rather than through 
limitations on liability.172 Tort law has a variety of rules that expressly 
delineate the scope of recoverable harm—rules that reflect policy judgments 
about the manageability of litigation and the goals of tort law.173 In 
securities fraud litigation, courts have paid relatively little attention to the 
conceptualization of harm. Part IV considers that question. Before 
addressing the question of harm, however, the next Section briefly considers 
the courts’ analysis of causal complexity in securities fraud cases. 
C. CAUSAL COMPLEXITY IN SECURITIES LITIGATION 
The courts’ application of tort law causation principles, particularly 
complex causation principles, to securities fraud has been highly imperfect. 
The problems begin with the courts’ reliance on negligence cases despite 
the fact that securities fraud involves an intentional tort. The courts have 
modeled the causation requirement in securities fraud on the traditional 
concepts of but-for and proximate cause;174 indeed, the courts freely employ 
these terms, citing to common law authorities such as the Second 
Restatement.175 Yet, as described above, these concepts play a very different 
role in intentional torts. Although the common law employs a variety of 
approaches in intentional tort cases, it often authorizes recovery in fraud 
cases for harms that would be excluded under the federal courts’ current 
 
anomaly in which happenstance timing determines whether an additional cause will constitute 
a multiple cause that has no legal effect or a preempting cause that relieves the defendant of 
liability). 
 172. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIAB. § 8 (2000) 
(apportioning responsibility according to the “nature of [each] person’s risk-creating conduct” 
and “the strength of the causal connection between [such] conduct and the harm”); see also 
Green, supra note 134, at 708–09 (arguing that courts often improperly consider “duplicating 
‘cause[s]’” that never took place or caused any harm and that these factors should instead be 
viewed as “a matter of harm identification” and reflected in the calculation of damages). 
 173. The rules include limitations on the scope of actionable harm—such as the 
preclusion, in some cases, of recovery for emotional distress and economic damage—as well as 
extensions of the initial tortfeasor’s liability to foreseeable wrongful actions by others—such as 
liability for malpractice committed in treating the original injury. 
 174. See, e.g., Berckeley Inv. Group, Ltd. v. Colkitt, 455 F.3d 195, 222 (3d Cir. 2006) 
(“Causation in the securities context is strikingly similar to the familiar standard in the torts 
context, but with different labels. In the securities realm, ‘but for’ causation is referred to as 
‘reliance, or transaction causation,’ and ‘proximate cause’ is known as ‘loss causation.’”). 
 175. See supra note 23. 
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loss causation requirement.176 As a result, despite the Supreme Court’s 
statement in Dura,177 common law fraud does not offer strong support for 
the causation jurisprudence that courts have developed under Rule 10b-5. In 
particular, the common law cases do not require that the plaintiff’s loss be a 
foreseeable materialization of the risk concealed by the defendant’s 
misrepresentation.178 Moreover, missing from the analysis are the policy 
considerations that typically accompany an analysis of proximate cause in 
tort law and that have led to the elimination of proximate cause in the Third 
Restatement. 
Similarly missing are the principles that common law courts have 
developed to deal with causal complexity. Securities fraud almost invariably 
involves causal complexity. If the plaintiff’s harm is defined as a drop in 
stock price179—the measure suggested by Dura and applied post-Dura by the 
lower courts—then it is necessary to account for the multiple factors other 
than the defendant’s fraud that may have an effect on stock price. These 
factors include general market fluctuations, industry developments, global 
political and economic events, and firm-specific developments unrelated to 
the fraud. Federal courts have uniformly reasoned that defendants are not 
responsible for stock price movements due to nontortious factors, and 
litigation post-Dura involves the presentation of expert testimony designed 
to isolate the market price reaction associated with the revelation of the 
defendant’s fraud. Courts impose this requirement not in the calculation of 
damages, but at the threshold stages of evaluating the sufficiency of the 
pleadings or authorizing class certification.180 It is not clear that the process 
is based on tort principles. 
The distortion of common law principles is perhaps most evident in 
several recent securities cases applying the concepts of superseding and 
intervening cause. Notwithstanding the tort law limitations on when an 
intervening event breaks the causal chain, courts have reasoned that the 
occurrence of nonfraudulent events that contribute to a decline in stock 
price severs the link between the defendant’s fraud and the plaintiff’s 
 
 176. See Andrew L. Merritt, A Consistent Model of Loss Causation in Securities Fraud Litigation: 
Suiting the Remedy to the Wrong, 66 TEX. L. REV. 469, 501–06 (1988) (describing various common 
law cases in which courts have used expansive measures of damages inconsistent with a strict 
causation requirement). 
 177. See Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 343 (2005) (“Judicially implied private 
securities fraud actions resemble . . . common-law deceit and misrepresentation actions.”). 
 178. Cf. Lentell v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 396 F.3d 161, 173 (2d Cir. 2005) (describing loss 
causation as requiring “both that the loss be foreseeable and that the loss be caused by the 
materialization of the concealed risk” (emphasis omitted)). 
 179. The conceptualization of plaintiff’s harm is considered in more detail in Part IV, infra. 
 180. The calculation of damages in securities fraud cases has received relatively little 
attention and is considered in more detail in Part IV, infra. 
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harm.181 For example, in In re Merrill Lynch & Co. Research Reports Securities 
Litigation, Judge Pollack found an intervening cause in the “precipitous price 
decline” resulting from the bursting of the internet bubble.182 Similarly, in 
D.E. & J Ltd. Partnership v. Conaway, the court identified as intervening 
events “the events of September 11, 2001, recession[,] . . . the war in 
Afghanistan[,] . . . . [and] Kmart’s bankruptcy filing.”183 
Application of the analysis in McCarthy184 suggests that the courts are 
allowing subsequent events to break the causal chain too readily. Even if 
general market movements, a recession, or adverse developments at the 
company cause a price decline, those events are normal risks of securities 
investments and therefore are foreseeable to the defendant. Moreover, the 
consequence of those events—a price decline—is no different from the 
consequence of the original fraud. 
IV.  THE HARM IN SECURITIES FRAUD 
Both the Dura decision and common law tort doctrine highlight the 
critical connection between causation and harm. But what is the harm to 
individual investors in a securities fraud case?185 Following Dura’s direction, 
a possible starting point is the measure of recoverable damages for common 
law fraud or deceit. The Second Restatement186 authorizes the award of 
damages as follows: 
§ 549. Measure of Damages for Fraudulent Misrepresentation 
(1) The recipient of a fraudulent misrepresentation is entitled to 
recover as damages in an action of deceit against the maker the 
pecuniary loss to him of which the misrepresentation is a legal 
cause, including 
 
 181. See, e.g., DeMarco v. Robertson Stephens Inc., 318 F. Supp. 2d 110, 122 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) 
(“If the loss was caused by an intervening event not related to the fraud, then the § 10(b) claim 
must fail.”). 
 182. In re Merrill Lynch & Co. Research Reports Sec. Litig., 273 F. Supp. 2d 351, 362 
(S.D.N.Y. 2003), aff’d sub nom. Lentell, 396 F.3d at 161. 
 183. D.E. & J Ltd. P’ship v. Conaway, 284 F. Supp. 2d 719, 749 n.26 (E.D. Mich. 2003). 
 184. Canada ex rel. Landy v. McCarthy, 567 N.W.2d 496, 507 (Minn. 1997); see supra note 
162 and accompanying text. 
 185. The analysis in this Part focuses on the injury suffered by a particular investor who 
purchases securities at a time when defendants have injected misinformation into the market. 
This Part does not consider whether investors are systematically injured by the presence of 
fraudulent information or the potential social costs associated with securities fraud. See, e.g., 
Fox, supra note 85, at 871–72 (identifying possible differences between private costs and social 
costs, and explaining potential efficiency justifications for imposing liability). 
 186. Dura cites the Second Restatement of Torts, not the Third. See Dura Pharms., Inc. v. 
Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 343–44 (2005). 
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(a) the difference between the value of what he has received in 
the transaction and its purchase price or other value given for 
it; and 
(b) pecuniary loss suffered otherwise as a consequence of the 
recipient’s reliance upon the misrepresentation. 
(2) The recipient of a fraudulent misrepresentation in a business 
transaction is also entitled to recover additional damages sufficient 
to give him the benefit of his contract with the maker, if these 
damages are proved with reasonable certainty.187 
Consider this approach as applied to the typical securities fraud plaintiff 
who purchases securities at a time when the defendant’s falsely positive 
statements or concealment of negative information has inflated the market 
price. The plaintiff pays a price that is higher than he or she would have 
paid if the market knew the truth. At a subsequent point in time, the fraud is 
revealed—either directly through a corrective disclosure or indirectly 
through the occurrence of events that are inconsistent with the original lies. 
The stock price declines.188 
Prior to Dura, courts commonly characterized the plaintiff’s harm in 
terms of artificial price inflation or overpayment: the plaintiff purchased 
securities that were overpriced because of the defendant’s fraud. This 
measure appears to correspond to section 549(1)(a) of the Restatement—the 
amount of artificial price inflation reflects the difference between the price 
the plaintiff paid and the value of the securities received. The Dura Court 
adopted (or at least strongly suggested) an alternative formulation of the 
plaintiff’s harm, concluding that an investor is harmed if and when the price 
of the purchased securities declines.189 This characterization of the harm 
may be termed “outcome harm.”190 Arguably, this measure corresponds to 
section 549(1)(b)—the pecuniary loss suffered by the plaintiff. Section 
549(2) authorizes the recovery of expectation damages in a limited number 
of common law fraud cases—a measure of damages that courts have 
generally not permitted in securities fraud cases.191 
 
 187. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 549 (1977). 
 188. Analogous reasoning applies in the case of a defrauded seller. Although such cases 
exist, see, e.g., Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 228 (1988); Mitchell v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur 
Co., 446 F.2d 90, 95–96 (10th Cir. 1971), they are comparatively rare and present fewer 
concerns about market integrity and moral hazard. For simplicity, this Article focuses on the 
case of the defrauded purchaser. 
 189. See Dura, 544 U.S. at 342. As discussed below, the shift from an ex ante to an ex post 
perspective has important implications for the causation analysis. 
 190. See Claire Finkelstein, Is Risk a Harm?, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 963, 966 (2003) (using the 
term “outcome harm” to describe tangible injuries and to distinguish harm from risk of harm). 
 191. See Estate Counseling Serv., Inc. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 303 
F.2d 527, 533 (10th Cir. 1962) (explaining that the measure of damages is the plaintiff’s “‘out 
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Tort law offers an alternative understanding of Dura as grounded in the 
distinction between risk and injury. Under such an understanding, the 
plaintiff’s purchase at an artificially inflated price creates the risk of injury, 
but a tangible injury occurs only upon a subsequent drop in stock price. This 
distinction is well developed in some areas, such as torts involving exposure 
to hazardous substances. Tort law generally does not treat a risk of harm as 
actionable. 
Finally, the ability of a plaintiff to engage in multiple securities 
transactions with offsetting effects raises the issue of whether harm should 
be conceptualized on an aggregate basis. The appropriateness of netting 
gains and losses that result from the defendant’s conduct is considered in 
Part IV.D. 
A. ARTIFICIAL PRICE INFLATION 
Securities fraud decisions rarely address damages. When they do, they 
describe recoverable damages as the plaintiff’s “out-of-pocket” loss. As the 
Supreme Court explained in 1900, out-of-pocket loss is “‘the difference 
between the real value of the stock at the time of the sale, and the fictitious 
value at which the buyer was induced to purchase.’”192 Similarly, the Court 
in Randall v. Loftsgaarden described the normal measure of damages in a 
10b-5 case as the plaintiff’s “out-of-pocket” loss—that is, the “‘difference 
between the fair value of all that the [plaintiff] received and the fair value of 
what he would have received had there been no fraudulent conduct.’”193 
The difference between the price that the plaintiff paid and what the 
securities were really worth may be the most natural description of the 
plaintiff’s harm from securities fraud. This measure approaches damages 
from an ex ante perspective by asking what the securities would have been 
worth at the time of the purchase absent the fraud. The difference between 
the purchase price and the “true value” is the amount by which the 
misrepresentation artificially inflated the purchase price, or the amount that 
the plaintiff overpaid. 
The standard method of establishing artificial price inflation is to 
ascertain what the stock price would have been in the absence of the fraud. 
Thus, the concept of artificial price inflation is closely tied to the 
methodology of financial economics in which investments are valued on the 
basis of their expected future cash flows. Investors use information about the 
issuer to predict future cash flows, and in an efficient market, the market 
 
of pocket’” loss, which is “not what the plaintiff might have gained, but what he has lost by 
being deceived into the purchase”). The extent to which an award of expectation-based 
damages would be consistent with the limiting language of the PSLRA is unclear. 
 192. Sigafus v. Porter, 179 U.S. 116, 124 (1900) (emphasis added) (quoting High v. Berret, 
23 A. 1004, 1004 (Pa. 1892)). 
 193. Randall v. Loftsgaarden, 478 U.S. 647, 661–62 (1986) (alteration in original) (quoting 
Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 155 (1972)). 
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price reflects this information. The logic of Basic is premised upon the 
assumption that misinformation, by misleading the market, has the effect of 
distorting market price. Under the pre-Dura approach, expert economists 
reconstructed the stock’s value at the time of the purchase based on various 
methods of modeling the amount of fraud-induced price inflation.194 
The rationale for using artificial price inflation as a measure of damages 
is that the plaintiff’s damage occurs at the time of purchase; the plaintiff is 
damaged by overpaying for the purchased stock. Events that occur 
subsequent to the purchase may assist the trier of fact in ascertaining the 
stock’s value at the time of purchase, but a subsequent decline in purchase 
price is not an independent actionable harm, whether or not it relates to the 
subject of the misrepresentations. Ex post developments are, by definition, 
irrelevant. 
Despite the attractions of this characterization of the plaintiff’s harm—
both its consistency with modern finance theory and the simplicity that it 
lends to causation analysis—the Dura Court was fairly clear in rejecting it. As 
the Court stated, “at the moment the transaction takes place, the plaintiff 
has suffered no loss.”195 What did the Court mean by this statement? The 
absence of a realization event—a subsequent transaction in which the 
plaintiff sells the stock for its true value—should not be fatal to the plaintiff’s 
claim that he or she has overpaid. Tort law does not require a plaintiff who 
purchases a piece of glass in place of a diamond to sell that piece of glass in 
order to establish his or her claim of fraud. 
One reason why tort law does not require a realization event is that, in 
most cases, the discrepancy between the object’s true value and its value as 
fraudulently represented is readily ascertainable. It is clear that the piece of 
glass is worth far less than a genuine diamond, and a determination of the 
“true value” of the glass is reasonably straightforward. Valuation in securities 
litigation, however, is more complicated.196 The estimates and predictions 
 
 194. See, e.g., David Tabak & Chudozie Okongwu, Inflation Methodologies in Securities 
Fraud Cases: Theory and Practice (July 2002) (unpublished manuscript), available at http:// 
ssrn.com/abstract=315919 (describing common approaches to measuring artificial price 
inflation); see also David Tabak, Inflation and Damages in a Post-Dura World 3, 6–12 (Sept. 25, 
2007) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1017334 (stating that 
pre-Dura, a plaintiff’s losses were typically asserted to be the amount of artificial price inflation, 
and describing the effect of Dura on damages methodology). 
 195. Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 342 (2005). 
 196. In addition, although most commentators agree that the securities markets are 
efficient in the sense that information is incorporated into stock price, there is far less 
consensus that the resulting market prices represent the “true value” of the securities in 
question. See Baruch Lev & Meiring de Villiers, Stock Price Crashes and 10b-5 Damages: A Legal, 
Economic, and Policy Analysis, 47 STAN. L. REV. 7, 20 (1994) (“[O]verwhelming empirical 
evidence suggests that capital markets are not fundamentally efficient.”); Jill E. Fisch, Picking a 
Winner, 20 J. CORP. L. 451, 463–64 (1995) (book review) (explaining the difference between 
informational efficiency and fundamental-value efficiency); see also Jonathan R. Macey & 
Geoffrey P. Miller, Good Finance, Bad Economics: An Analysis of the Fraud-on-the-Market Theory, 42 
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that form the basis of an expert’s reconstruction of value are imprecise, and 
there is the risk that subsequent stock price developments may influence the 
expert’s opinion, particularly if the stock price drop occurs upon disclosure 
of the fraud. In addition, stock price is “a dynamic, not a static, concept and 
the market may re-evaluate and re-price a stock on a daily, hourly or even 
momentary basis.”197 
Dura, then, may reflect an evidentiary problem—the Court’s skepticism 
about the accuracy with which experts can reconstruct the stock’s 
hypothetical value in a world of full disclosure. It is far easier to conclude 
that the plaintiff overpaid if the fraud is subsequently revealed and the stock 
price drops in response to that disclosure.198 The price drop is compelling 
circumstantial evidence that the price was artificially inflated at the time of 
the purchase,199 but even if a subsequent price drop is strong evidence of 
overpayment, it is unclear why it would be the only acceptable basis for 
establishing price inflation. As a practical matter, plaintiffs may have 
recourse to other evidence.200 
Alternatively, the Dura Court may have been rejecting the theory that 
overpayment is, in itself, an actionable harm, concluding instead that harm 
requires an actual decline in market price. This reading of Dura is strongly 
supported by the Court’s statement that “the inflated purchase payment is 
offset by ownership of a share that at that instant possesses equivalent 
value.”201 The statement seems to indicate that because the stock can be sold 
at the market price, the market price reflects the stock’s true value, and 
there is no economic loss unless or until the stock price falls below the 
purchase price. Of course, this reasoning is directly at odds with the 
rationale behind the Basic decision.202 The shift from an ex ante perspective 
 
STAN. L. REV. 1059, 1077–79 (1990) (questioning whether the Basic Court’s conception of 
market efficiency supports its adoption of fraud on the market). 
 197. Madge S. Thorsen et al., Rediscovering the Economics of Loss Causation, 6 J. BUS. & SEC. L. 
93, 95 (2006). 
 198. As later discussion explains, the task of separating the price effect associated with the 
corrective disclosure from that due to unrelated causes is, in fact, considerably more 
challenging than it may initially appear. 
 199. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 9, Dura, 544 U.S. 336 (No. 03-932), available at 
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/03-932.pdf (recording 
the petitioners’ argument that actual marketplace decline in value is a better indicator than 
speculation as to what the price would have been at the time of purchase). 
 200. See, e.g., Scott D. Hakala, Current Economic and Expert Issues in Securities Litigation 
18–23 (Feb. 1, 2006) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Iowa Law Review), available at 
https://plusweb.org/files/Events/all.star7Econ.%20Issues%20-%20Securities%20Lit.pdf 
(describing other methods of establishing price inflation). 
 201. Dura, 544 U.S. at 342. 
 202. Madge Thorsen and others have attempted to address the Dura language by 
characterizing the plaintiff’s loss as artificial price inflation that the plaintiff cannot recoup. See 
Thorsen et al., supra note 197, at 98. The authors argue that, like the price of the stock, the 
inflationary component of that price can fluctuate and that the plaintiff’s loss is measured by 
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to an ex post perspective reflected in the switch from artificial price inflation 
to outcome harm has important implications for causation analysis. 
B. OUTCOME HARM 
The conception of the plaintiff’s harm that seems most consistent with 
the language in Dura is a drop in the stock price subsequent to the plaintiff’s 
purchase. Under this approach, “a plaintiff’s damages are equal to the 
difference between what it paid to purchase securities and how much it 
received when it sold those securities.”203 There is nothing inherently 
unreasonable about describing the plaintiff’s harm in this way; indeed, an 
investor is more likely to perceive his or her loss as the amount of the price 
drop rather than the amount of overpayment. Looking to the price drop 
also avoids the need to establish the counterfactual price of the stock under 
circumstances that did not, in fact, occur. 
Focusing on the subsequent stock price drop reopens the issue of 
realization. If Dura’s holding is premised on the theory that the plaintiff’s 
loss is not real until the stock price drops, it is unclear why a price drop 
without a sale is sufficient.204 Arguably, a stock price drop does not cause a 
plaintiff actual economic harm unless and until the plaintiff sells the 
stock.205 A paper loss is not the equivalent of an out-of-pocket loss; the 
investor can always recoup the loss if the price subsequently rises. Indeed, 
the PSLRA recognizes the possibility that the stock price will rebound and 
limits the amount of the plaintiff’s recoverable loss to the difference 
 
the difference between the amount of inflation at the time of his or her purchase and the 
inflation at the time of the subsequent sale. Id. Of course, if the Dura Court’s concern is that 
measuring artificial price inflation is speculative, this alternative characterization of the loss is 
more problematic because the court must determine both the original amount of price 
inflation and the extent to which subsequent developments have affected the inflationary 
component, as opposed to the stock’s true value. Thorsen and her co-authors advocate the use 
of expert testimony to solve this problem. See id. at 109–13 (discussing event studies and other 
valuation techniques). 
 203. Argent Classic Convertible Arbitrage Fund L.P. v. Rite Aid Corp., 315 F. Supp. 2d 666, 
679 (E.D. Pa. 2004); see also Semerenko v. Cendant Corp., 223 F.3d 165, 185 (3d Cir. 2000) 
(“Where the value of the security does not actually decline as a result of an alleged 
misrepresentation, it cannot be said that there is in fact an economic loss attributable to that 
misrepresentation.”). 
 204. See In re CIGNA Corp. Sec. Litig., 459 F. Supp. 2d 338, 343 n.5 (E.D. Pa. 2006) 
(discussing the testimony of the plaintiff’s expert, who distinguished between an “investment 
loss”—i.e., where the stock is sold at less than the purchase price—and an “economic/ 
inflationary loss”—i.e., where stock is purchased at an inflated price and then sold (or held 
until the end of the class period) at a less inflated price). 
 205. For example, under the Internal Revenue Code, an investor generally does not realize 
a loss until he or she sells the stock. Michelle Arnopol Cecil, Bankruptcy Reform: What’s Tax Got to 
Do with It?, 71 MO. L. REV. 879, 886 (2006) (“Under the Tax Code, gain [or loss] inherent in 
property is not recognized . . . until there is a realization event, which is loosely defined as a sale 
or other disposition of the property.” (citing I.R.C. § 1001(a), (c) (2000))). 
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between the price paid by the plaintiff and the mean trading price during 
the ninety-day period following disclosure of the fraud.206 
Similarly, defining harm as a drop below the purchase price would 
prevent plaintiffs from recovering if the stock price does not fall. Even if a 
plaintiff is misled into overpaying, market movements or unrelated issuer 
developments may cause the stock price to rise beyond the purchase price. 
Dura does not address the question of whether a plaintiff can recover 
damages for securities fraud when the stock price has increased due to 
unrelated factors, although Justice Breyer posed this question to counsel at 
oral argument.207 At least a few lower courts have held that a plaintiff does 
not suffer an economic loss if the stock price does not fall below the 
purchase price.208 
Putting aside the issue of realization, the move to an ex post measure of 
damages creates an additional problem in that, although the defendant’s 
fraud may cause the stock price to rise, it is the revelation of that fraud—or, 
more likely, the disclosure of the issuer’s true financial condition—and not 
the fraud itself that causes the subsequent price drop. As then-Chief Judge 
Winter put it: “The issue is not whether a misstatement ‘caused’ a loss. . . . 
For example, losses due to insolvency, much less insolvency itself, are not 
‘caused’ by misrepresentations.”209 
 
 206. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(e)(1) (2000). If the plaintiff sells the securities prior to the 
expiration of the ninety-day period, the sale cuts off the period of time for calculating the mean 
trading price. Id. § 78u-4(e)(2). 
 207. See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 199, at 7–10 (questioning whether a 
plaintiff would have a loss if he purchased stock based on misrepresentations that the company 
had gold, when the company never had gold but subsequently found platinum, causing the 
stock price to rise). 
 208. See, e.g., In re Estee Lauder Cos. Sec. Litig., No. 06 Civ. 2505 (LAK), 2007 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 38491, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. May 21, 2007). The court noted: 
As it is perfectly plain that plaintiff would have profited if he sold after September 
11, 2006, may have profited even if he sold before September 11, 2006, and may 
well profit in the future if he has not yet sold, this complaint patently fails to plead 
loss causation for this reason alone. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). Likewise, the court in In re Veeco Instruments Inc. Securities Litigation 
stated: 
Plaintiffs’ damages calculations could not include Class Members who purchased 
Veeco stock during the Class Period and either sold it at a profit, or retained it past 
the point after the Class Period when the stock price first recovered to the price at 
which the shares were purchased . . . because such Class Members can prove  
no economic loss that is attributable to any of the Defendants’ alleged 
misrepresentations. 
In re Veeco Instruments Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 05 MDL 01695 (CM), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85629, 
at *31 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 7, 2007). 
 209. AUSA Life Ins. Co. v. Ernst & Young, 206 F.3d 202, 235 (2d Cir. 2000) (Winter, C.J., 
dissenting); cf. In re Merrill Lynch & Co. Research Reports Sec. Litig., 273 F. Supp. 2d 351, 364 
(S.D.N.Y. 2003) (dismissing a complaint because “plaintiffs have not alleged that there was any 
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An ex post analysis also complicates the evidentiary issue involved in 
measuring value. First, because corrective disclosures are often prompted by 
the materialization of an undisclosed risk, the stock price drop in response 
to such a disclosure is likely to reflect that materialization rather than simply 
nondisclosure of the risk itself.210 The ex post stock price drop may well be 
greater than the initial price inflation even if the stock price drop is entirely 
responsive to the corrective disclosure.211 In addition, the disclosure reveals 
not just the underlying bad news, but also the fact that it was fraudulently 
concealed. The market reaction to this revelation may reflect concerns 
about issues such as management integrity and the anticipated likelihood of 
future litigation. 
Second, a price drop—whether in response to a corrective disclosure or 
other events that reveal the truth—is likely to occur weeks or even months 
after the defendant’s misrepresentation and the plaintiff’s purchase. This 
lag typically is substantial. Jim Cox and Randall Thomas found that the 
median length of a class period—the time between the misstatement and 
the revelation of the truth to the market—is 10.5 months.212 During this 
10.5-month period, the intervention of other factors that contribute to a 
stock price decline is more than foreseeable—it is likely.213 The court is then 
left with the task of sorting out the extent of this loss for which the 
defendant should be held responsible. Significantly, this task is precisely the 
type of inquiry traditionally handled in tort law through the doctrine of 
proximate cause. As Prosser and Keeton explain: “Once it is established that 
the defendant’s conduct has in fact been one of the causes of the plaintiff’s 
injury, there remains the question whether the defendant should be legally 
responsible for the injury.”214 The Third Restatement characterizes this 
 
link between the allegedly overly optimistic ratings and the financial troubles of 24/7 or 
Interliant that led to their financial demise in the wake of the bursting [Internet] bubble”), aff’d 
sub nom. Lentell v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 396 F.3d 161 (2d Cir. 2005). 
 210. Jonathan Macey and Geoffrey Miller make this point with respect to the Basic case, 
observing that a stock price reaction to the announcement of the merger might not mean that 
the market was misled by Basic’s denial of merger negotiations, but might instead mean that 
“the market does not value a merger negotiation as highly as a merger agreement.” Macey & 
Miller, supra note 196, at 1088. 
 211. One reason why the stock price drop may be greater is that investors may anticipate 
the costs of subsequent litigation over the fraud. 
 212. James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, Letting Billions Slip Through Your Fingers: Empirical 
Evidence and Legal Implications of the Failure of Financial Institutions to Participate in Securities Class 
Action Settlements, 58 STAN. L. REV. 411, 429 (2005). 
 213. The Dura Court acknowledged as much. See Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 
336, 343 (2005) (“Other things being equal, the longer the time between purchase and sale, . . . 
the more likely that other factors caused the loss.”). 
 214. KEETON ET AL., supra note 23, § 42, at 272–73 (footnote omitted). 
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determination as a policy judgment rather than a scientific inquiry.215 The 
pedigree of proximate cause dates back more than 100 years. As set out by 
the Supreme Court in 1876: 
The true rule is, that what is the proximate cause of an injury is 
ordinarily a question for the jury. It is not a question of science or 
of legal knowledge. It is to be determined as a fact, in view of the 
circumstances of fact attending it. The primary cause may be the 
proximate cause of a disaster, though it may operate through 
successive instruments, as an article at the end of a chain may be 
moved by a force applied to the other end, that force being the 
proximate cause of the movement, or as in the oft-cited case of the 
squib thrown in the market-place.216 
Although tort law takes seriously the proximate cause inquiry—the task 
of determining the harms for which the defendant is legally accountable—
securities law does not. The federal courts have generally assumed, with little 
or no discussion, that the defendant’s responsibility is limited to the amount 
of the price drop attributable to the fraud;217 indeed, courts have rejected 
expert opinions that failed to use event studies or comparable methodology 
to account for unrelated market movements and similar factors.218 Recent 
opinions describe recoverable damages as the amount of ex ante price 
inflation that is subsequently removed from the stock price through a 
corrective disclosure or other event, limited by the extent to which the 
subsequent stock price drop can be attributed to other factors.219 
The rationale for imposing this limit on liability is unclear. A plaintiff’s 
pecuniary or out-of-pocket loss is, after all, the difference between the 
purchase price and the (actual or potential) sale price. If we take the 
preceding discussion seriously, the full amount of that loss is real. To the 
extent that other causal factors contributed to the loss, the defendant’s 
responsibility for that loss should, under tort law, depend on complex 
causation analysis. But the federal courts’ references to these principles have 
been limited and incorrect. 
 
 215. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 34 cmt. a (Proposed 
Final Draft No. 1, 2005) (noting the shift away from “legal scientism” in determining proximate 
cause). 
 216. Milwaukee & Saint Paul Ry. Co. v. Kellogg, 94 U.S. 469, 474 (1876). 
 217. See, e.g., In re Executive Telecard, Ltd. Sec. Litig., 979 F. Supp. 1021, 1025 (S.D.N.Y. 
1997) (stating that damage calculation “require[s] elimination of that portion of the price 
decline that is the result of forces unrelated to the wrong”); In re Oracle Sec. Litig., 829 F. Supp. 
1176, 1181 (N.D. Cal. 1993) (explaining the need “to distinguish between the fraud-related and 
non-fraud related influences on the stock’s price behavior”). 
 218. Executive Telecard, 979 F. Supp. at 1027 (explaining that the expert’s “failure to conduct 
a thorough ‘event study’ would be reason enough to exclude his proposed testimony”). 
 219. See, e.g., In re CIGNA Corp. Sec. Litig., 459 F. Supp. 2d 338, 349 (E.D. Pa. 2006) 
(describing case law concerning economic loss). Damages are also limited by the ninety-day 
look-back provision. 
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First, as indicated above, courts have applied an erroneous conception 
of intervening cause. Under traditional tort law principles, an intervening 
cause does not automatically limit or eliminate the defendant’s liability. 
Rather, the intervening cause must be sufficient to justify denying liability 
that the defendant otherwise would bear. In particular, the intervening 
cause must not be foreseeable.220 Yet the occurrence of market forces and 
firm-specific developments that impact firm value is not just foreseeable—it 
is virtually assured. These developments will predictably cause the stock 
price to fluctuate, and with any security, there is a predictable risk that the 
fluctuations will result in a drop in stock price. By inducing the plaintiff to 
invest in the subject securities, the defendant knowingly exposes the plaintiff 
to the risk of the resulting loss. Nor is the loss from a market decline 
different in kind from a loss due to a corrective disclosure; in both cases, the 
drop in stock price reduces the value of the securities that the plaintiff was 
fraudulently persuaded to purchase. 
Second, the common law does not uniformly relieve defendants of 
liability in multiple causation cases, even where innocent factors contributed 
to the plaintiff’s harm. Rather, under the common law, the presence of 
multiple causal factors does not eliminate liability so long as the defendant’s 
conduct is a factual cause of the harm. The Third Restatement contains 
extensive commentary on how to allocate responsibility for damages in cases 
of multiple causation and looks to policy considerations such as culpability, 
recognizing that the allocation is not a scientific inquiry. Although event 
studies can link a stock price reaction to an information event, they cannot 
determine the extent to which that stock price reaction is the right measure 
of recoverable harm. 
Third, there are reasons to be concerned about judicial efforts to divide 
stock-drop harm between that which is fraud-based and that which is due to 
nonfraudulent factors.221 Market and other informational developments do 
not operate on stock price independently but in combination. Their effect 
on any given company depends on firm-specific characteristics.222 The stock 
 
 220. Indeed, under tort law, an initial tortfeasor is liable for any additional harm caused by 
the malpractice of a treating doctor; this malpractice does not constitute a superseding cause. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 457 (1965). 
 221. This concern is heightened to the extent that plaintiffs bear the burden of establishing 
this allocation to a degree of scientific certainty. See, e.g., In re Omnicom Group, Inc. Sec. Litig., 
541 F. Supp. 2d 546, 554 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (rejecting an event study that disaggregated only some 
but not all of the potentially confounding factors as insufficient “to establish that the alleged 
misrepresentations actually caused Plaintiffs’ loss”). 
 222. For example, some commentators have observed that increased industry regulation, 
although costly, may be advantageous for large or established companies because they are able 
to bear the costs and the regulation may reduce competition. See, e.g., Jill E. Fisch, How Do 
Corporations Play Politics?: The FedEx Story, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1495, 1551–52 (2005) (describing 
how congressional adoption of new noise regulations benefitted FedEx at the expense of its 
small competitors). 
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price of a financially troubled issuer is likely to respond more dramatically  
to negative market developments than that of a healthy company.223 
Announcements of adverse developments at one company may affect the 
stock prices of other companies in the same industry. These interactions 
may taint the accuracy of experts’ adjustments for industry or market 
developments. 
Perhaps most troublingly, corporate decisionmakers are often able to 
control the timing of their disclosures, enabling them to manipulate the 
extent to which the company’s stock price reacts to a corrective disclosure. 
Faced with the need to reveal their fraud, defendants can deliberately 
introduce additional causal factors. For example, before disclosing a fraud, 
corporate officials may release “unrelated” negative information that 
preemptively reduces stock price. This behavior is sometimes described as 
“walking down the stock price.”224 Defendants also may bundle a corrective 
disclosure with good news that offsets the effect of the negative information 
on stock price.225 Still another alternative is to delay a corrective disclosure 
until immediately after market or industry bad news has caused stock prices 
to fall. This control over market information offers a substantial policy 
justification for limiting the role of other causal factors in reducing 
defendants’ responsibility. 
C. RISK VERSUS INJURY—ANOTHER VIEW OF DURA 
The foregoing discussion has read the Dura decision as endorsing an ex 
post stock price drop, or some portion thereof, as the correct measure of a 
plaintiff’s economic injury. An alternative rationale for Dura’s holding is the 
tort law distinction between risk and injury. One can characterize the 
defendant’s original misstatements as causing not a present harm (reflected 
 
 223. Indeed, the interaction of the fraud and other market developments arguably 
resembles the increased sensitivity of some tort victims to physical injury, as reflected in the 
thin-skull rule. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 461 (1965) (subjecting a defendant “to 
liability for harm to another although a physical condition of the other . . . makes the injury 
greater than that which the actor as a reasonable man should have foreseen as a probable result 
of his conduct”). Similarly, it is plausible that companies involved in fraud are especially 
susceptible to ruinous harm upon the occurrence of adverse economic events. Indeed, many of 
the companies that collapsed due to the bursting of the dot-com bubble—as opposed to 
weathering it—were those engaged in financial accounting manipulations and similar practices. 
 224. See, e.g., Coughlin et al., supra note 75, at 26 (“[S]ecurities-fraud perpetrators could 
just as easily ‘walk down’ the stock price by the selective disclosure of seemingly unrelated ‘bad’ 
news concerning the company and thereby avoid a sudden stock-price reaction, and insulate 
themselves from liability.”); Ann Morales Olazábal, Loss Causation in Fraud-on-the-Market Cases 
Post-Dura Pharmaceuticals, 3 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 337, 370 (2006) (criticizing the Eleventh 
Circuit’s decision in Robbins v. Koger Props., Inc., 116 F.3d 1441 (11th Cir. 1997), for allowing 
issuers to “‘walk’ the stock price down with other bad news”). 
 225. See, e.g., James C. Spindler, Why Shareholders Want Their CEOs to Lie More After Dura 
Pharmaceuticals, 95 GEO. L.J. 653, 674–80 (2007) (describing how bundling can enable firms to 
mask fraud-related losses). 
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in the overpayment) but a risk of future harm. It is not until that future 
harm occurs (in the form of a stock price drop related to the disclosure of 
the fraud) that the plaintiff is damaged. This description is consistent with 
Dura’s statement that “the most logic alone permits us to say is that the 
higher purchase price will sometimes play a role in bringing about a future 
loss.”226 The tort literature’s exploration of the distinction between risk and 
injury offers a potentially useful window into the Dura decision. 
Tort law does not permit a private plaintiff to recover without proof of 
injury,227 and the dominant view in torts is that a risk of future harm does 
not, in itself, constitute an injury.228 As Matt Adler explains, the reason for 
this limitation is that applying the concept of risk, which is probabilistic, to a 
single individual and outcome is problematic.229 We can speak of 
probabilities, and therefore of increased risk, with respect to groups, but for 
any individual plaintiff, the defendant’s conduct either causes outcome 
harm (in which case the defendant should be liable) or does not (in which 
case the plaintiff arguably has suffered no actionable injury). Although risk 
may constitute a form of injury that is distinct from the harm that occurs if 
that risk materializes, tort law generally does not compensate plaintiffs for 
that injury.230 
Common law principles, then, arguably justify the move from price 
inflation to outcome harm. But it is not clear that the tort law analogy makes 
sense here. The tort law analysis of risk as a distinct harm generally occurs in 
products-liability or hazardous-substance-exposure cases. Although scientific 
evidence can establish the probability that a plaintiff will suffer harm, there 
is no way of scientifically quantifying that risk for a specific plaintiff. In 
 
 226. Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 343 (2005). 
 227. See, e.g., Pasley v. Freeman, (1789) 100 Eng. Rep. 450, 457 (K.B.) (stating that in a case 
of fraud or deceit, if “no injury is occasioned by the lie, it is not actionable[,] but if it be 
attended with a damage, it then becomes the subject of an action”); see also Goldberg & 
Zipursky, supra note 113, at 1636–41 (describing the injury requirement in tort law). 
 228. Consider recent decisions addressing this question: Paz v. Brush Engineered Materials, 
Inc., 949 So. 2d 1, 9 (Miss. 2007) (“This Court has continuously rejected the proposition that 
within tort law there exists a cause of action or a general category of injury consisting solely of 
potential future injury.”); Lowe v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 142 P.3d 1079, 1086–91 (Or. Ct. App. 
2006) (rejecting a claim that increased risk of harm constitutes cognizable injury). But see Jean 
Macchiaroli Eggen, Toxic Reproductive and Genetic Hazards in the Workplace: Challenging the Myths of 
the Tort and Workers’ Compensation Systems, 60 FORDHAM L. REV. 843, 888–93 (1992) (describing 
the imposition of liability for the creation of risk in limited situations); Finkelstein, supra note 
190, at 967–86 (recognizing that very few tort cases award compensation for risk alone, but 
nevertheless describing risk as a distinct injury from outcome harm and identifying case law 
supporting this conception). 
 229. See Matthew D. Adler, Risk, Death and Harm: The Normative Foundations of Risk 
Regulation, 87 MINN. L. REV. 1293, 1341–42 (2003). Stephen Perry’s analysis is similar. See 
Stephen R. Perry, Risk, Harm, and Responsibility, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAW, 
supra note 112, at 321, 330–39. 
 230. See Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 113, at 1636 (“Criminal law sometimes prohibits 
and punishes genuinely inchoate wrongs—uncompleted wrongful acts. Tort law does not.”). 
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contrast, the value of securities is a function of their return and the 
associated risk. Increasing the risk of an investment reduces its value to all 
investors. Thus, increased risk in the capital markets, unlike in traditional 
torts, is a real, and not a hypothetical, harm. 
Indeed, understanding that risk in the capital markets is real and 
quantifiable, rather than probabilistic and speculative, takes us further and 
offers an alternative way of characterizing the plaintiff’s harm. Securities 
fraud takes place in the context of an investment decision in which a 
plaintiff voluntarily enters into a transaction involving known and accepted 
risks. A plaintiff’s assessment and pricing decision are based on an 
evaluation of those risks. By lying about the issuer and its financial 
condition, the defendant distorts the plaintiff’s ability to make an informed 
investment decision. The economic significance of the lie is in how it relates 
to the known risks at the time of investment, not the extent to which those 
risks materialize and result in harm. In a sense, the plaintiff’s injury is akin 
to a failure to get true odds in a bet. 
Courts have difficulty conceptualizing this harm because the damage is 
to an expectancy interest. A critical difference between tort law and contract 
law is that tort law generally does not protect expectancy interests, while 
contract law does. This distinction is enforced through the economic-loss 
doctrine, which provides that plaintiffs cannot recover in unintentional tort 
cases for purely economic harms.231 Courts, however, often protect 
expectancy interests in those areas of tort law that approach the tort–
contract divide, such as fraudulent misrepresentation cases.232 Nonetheless, 
the reluctance to protect expectancy interests has generally been applied to 
federal securities fraud.233 This reluctance is somewhat counterintuitive in 
that an investment decision is quintessentially an expectancy interest. As 
indicated above, investors value securities based on their expected future cash 
flows. A defendant’s misrepresentation changes those expected cash flows and 
hence the investment’s value at the time of purchase, regardless of the ex 
post value of the cash flows. 
A simplified example, based loosely on the facts of the Dura case, is 
illustrative. Imagine that Dura had two products in development, Ceclor and 
 
 231. See Michael D. Lieder, Constructing a New Action for Negligent Infliction of Economic Loss: 
Building on Cardozo and Coase, 66 WASH. L. REV. 937, 944–46 (1991) (describing the economic-
loss doctrine and tracing its history). 
 232. In cases involving fraudulent misrepresentations, the majority of jurisdictions allow 
plaintiffs to recover expectancy-type, benefit-of-the-bargain damages, rather than merely out-of-
pocket damages. See DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES: DAMAGES–EQUITY–RESTITUTION § 9.2(1), 
at 695 (abr. 2d ed. 1993) (explaining that benefit-of-the-bargain damages in misrepresentation 
claims are like expectancy damages in contract claims). 
 233. Justice Kennedy posed the question at the oral argument of Dura. See Transcript of 
Oral Argument, supra note 199, at 12–13 (“[I]n your view, is the plaintiff entitled to an 
expectancy measure of damage, or is it more the traditional tort measure which is out-of-pocket 
losses?”). 
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AlSpiros. Dura disclosed information about the prospects of the two 
products, upon which the market calculated the following probabilities: 
 25% chance that only Ceclor will be successful 
 25% chance that only AlSpiros will be successful 
 10% chance that both products will be successful 
 40% chance that neither product will be successful 
Assume now that at the time of its public statements, Dura knew, but 
did not disclose, that AlSpiros created an unacceptable risk of cancer and 
would not receive FDA approval. Had Dura disclosed accurately, the market 
would have calculated the following: 
 35% chance that Ceclor will be successful 
 65% chance that neither Ceclor nor AlSpiros will be 
successful 
The plaintiff’s investment decision is distorted by the lost 35% chance 
that AlSpiros would be successful, and the plaintiff has suffered a loss based 
on the 35% probability of receiving future cash flows attributable to the 
successful development and marketing of AlSpiros. The lost opportunity, 
which exists whether or not Ceclor is successful, is part of the option value 
associated with the plaintiff’s investment.234 This option value is readily 
quantifiable, and in fact, a variety of options based on the future returns 
associated with the underlying security are commonly sold in the capital 
markets. 
The problem, from a tort perspective, is that even if the lost option has 
an ascertainable value, it is difficult to establish that the nonexistence of the 
option was a but-for cause of the stock price drop that occurred when the 
fraud was disclosed. After all, the defendant claimed that AlSpiros had only a 
35% chance of success. Whether or not the market was distorted by lies, it 
was more likely than not that AlSpiros would fail. The calculus becomes even 
more difficult if we change the hypothetical so that AlSpiros has a real but 
negligible chance of success, because now the market reaction in response 
to the revelation of AlSpiros’s failure likely overstates the effect of the 
defendant’s lie. 
 
 234. When an investor purchases a security, part of the value of that security reflects the 
possibility that the value of the security will increase in the future due to uncertain 
developments. The contingent value of the security associated with these uncertainties is option 
value. RICHARD A. BREALEY ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 597–616 (8th ed. 2006) 
(describing this option value, embedded in an asset, as a “real option”). 
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One approach used by some common law courts to protect this type of 
expectancy interest is the doctrine of lost chance.235 The lost-chance 
doctrine allows plaintiffs to recover when they cannot establish that the 
defendant’s tortious conduct caused their injuries but can establish some 
probability that nontortious conduct would have reduced or prevented 
those injuries. Lost-chance cases most commonly involve medical 
malpractice in which a plaintiff cannot prove that proper medical treatment 
would have saved the decedent’s life but can prove that such treatment 
would have created some increased statistical probability of survival.236 The 
defendant’s negligence—the failure to provide such treatment—denied the 
decedent this chance. 
The lost-chance cases are mixed, and the decisions reflect some 
disagreement on what the doctrine means. Some courts appear to frame 
their analysis largely in evidentiary terms.237 A few courts and commentators 
have suggested that lost chance is a distinct cause of action.238 The majority 
of cases, however, locate the doctrine within causation analysis. Under a 
traditional causation view, the plaintiff in a lost-chance case cannot establish 
but-for causation because the outcome, even with proper medical treatment, 
is speculative.239 The lost-chance doctrine allows a plaintiff’s claim to reach a 
 
 235. One of the oldest-known cases to apply the lost-chance doctrine was a 1911 English 
case in which the court awarded the plaintiff damages for the lost chance to win a beauty 
contest. Chaplin v. Hicks, [1911] 2 K.B. 786 (C.A.). The defendant failed to notify the plaintiff, 
a finalist, that she had qualified for an interview. Id. at 787–88. The court determined that the 
plaintiff’s lost chance to win, although only 25%, was sufficient to permit recovery. See id. at 
790–93. 
 236. The issue in these cases is not the probabilistic nature of the plaintiff’s evidence of 
causation, but the failure of such evidence to satisfy the “more likely than not” causation 
standard. This challenge is analogous, in some ways, to the determination of causation in 
cancer torts. See Donald T. Ramsey, The Trigger of Coverage for Cancer: When Does Genetic Mutation 
Become “Bodily Injury, Sickness, or Disease”?, 41 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 293, 309–10 (2001) 
(describing casual factors that may lead to the development of cancer); Barton C. Legum, Note, 
Increased Risk of Cancer as an Actionable Injury, 18 GA. L. REV. 563, 579–80 & n.68 (1984) 
(describing cancer torts as presenting the problem of multiple causation). Commentators have 
suggested alternative methodologies for addressing causation problems in this context. See, e.g., 
Glen O. Robinson, Multiple Causation in Tort Law: Reflections on the DES Cases, 68 VA. L. REV. 713, 
755 (1982) (proposing a risk-contribution approach). 
 237. See, e.g., Stephen A. Bullington, Arizona’s Loss of a Chance Doctrine: Not a Cause of Action, 
but More than an Evidentiary Rule, ARIZ. ATT’Y, Jan. 1997, at 28, 33 (describing Arizona’s lost-
chance doctrine as “a powerful evidentiary rule”). 
 238. See, e.g., Roberts v. Ohio Permanente Med. Group, Inc., 668 N.E.2d 480, 483–84 (Ohio 
1996) (recognizing a cause of action for lost chance of recovery); George J. Zilich, Note, Cutting 
Through the Confusion of the Loss-of-Chance Doctrine Under Ohio Law: A New Cause of Action or a New 
Standard of Causation?, 50 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 673, 682–85 (2002–2003) (describing the distinction 
between lost chance as a distinct cause of action and a new standard of causation). 
 239. See, e.g., Simmons v. W. Covina Med. Clinic, 260 Cal. Rptr. 772, 776 (Ct. App. 1989) 
(“A less than 50-50 possibility that defendants’ omission caused the harm does not meet the 
requisite reasonable medical probability test of proximate cause.”); Cooper v. Sisters of Charity 
of Cincinnati, Inc., 272 N.E.2d 97, 103 (Ohio 1971) (“We consider the better rule to be that in 
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jury even if his evidence is insufficient to establish that the doctor’s 
negligence was a but-for cause of the adverse medical outcome. 
An alternative approach is to view the lost-chance doctrine as a 
reformulation of the decedent’s injury, not in terms of outcome harm, but 
as the lost chance of survival. The defendant’s conduct did not cause, 
directly or indirectly, the decedent’s death; it merely deprived the decedent 
of a treatment that might have prevented that death. Some courts have 
adopted this approach explicitly.240 Many commentators have defended this 
analysis, both because it preserves the formal causation requirements and 
because it reflects a modern and realistic conception of the nature of the 
harm that the defendant’s conduct inflicts.241 In particular, this approach 
reduces the risk of unfairly exposing defendants to liability for causal factors 
beyond their control, such as by holding a doctor liable for a patient’s 
wrongful death when the doctor’s malpractice only reduced the patient’s 
likelihood of survival by 10%. Defining the patient’s injury as the lost 
chance, rather than the outcome harm, limits the defendant’s liability.242 
The application of the lost-chance doctrine outside the medical-
malpractice area and, in particular, to speculative economic gains is very 
limited.243 Nonetheless, the principles appear readily applicable to securities 
fraud. Returning to the Dura hypothetical, rather than describing the 
defendant’s conduct as exposing the plaintiff to an increased risk of loss, the 
plaintiff can be said to suffer the loss of the chance that AlSpiros would be 
successful and the future cash flows that would result from that success. 
Reformulating the plaintiff’s loss in terms of a lost chance has the advantage 
of limiting the problematic ex post analysis associated with outcome harm 
and is consistent with current judicial efforts to limit defendants’ 
responsibility for losses caused by subsequent events such as overall market 
movements. 
 
order to comport with the standard of proof of proximate cause, plaintiff in a malpractice case 
must prove that defendant’s negligence, in probability, proximately caused the death.”), 
overruled by Roberts, 668 N.E.2d at 483–84 (recognizing the lost-chance doctrine). 
 240. See, e.g., DeBurkarte v. Louvar, 393 N.W.2d 131, 137 (Iowa 1986) (“We believe the 
better approach is to allow recovery, but only for the lost chance of survival.”). 
 241. See, e.g., Nancy Levit, Ethereal Torts, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 136, 155–56 (1992) (“Courts 
and commentators explicitly acknowledge that the compensable injury is the lost chance 
itself.”). 
 242. See Herskovits v. Group Health Coop. of Puget Sound, 664 P.2d 474, 479 (Wash. 1983) 
(“Causing reduction of the opportunity to recover (loss of chance) . . . does not necessitate a 
total recovery against the negligent party for all damages caused by the victim’s death. Damages 
should be awarded to the injured party or his family based only on damages caused directly by 
premature death . . . .”). 
 243. But see Miller v. Allstate Ins. Co., 573 So. 2d 24, 29 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (“It is now 
an accepted principle of contract law . . . that recovery will be allowed where a plaintiff has been 
deprived of an opportunity or chance to gain an award or profit even where damages are 
uncertain.”). 
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D. NETTING 
A final issue in the conceptualization of the plaintiff’s harm concerns 
netting. Should the plaintiff’s losses be measured on a transaction-by-
transaction basis, or is it appropriate for the court to aggregate multiple 
transactions?244 Many investors, especially institutions, engage in multiple 
trades during the class period. Some of these transactions result in gains, 
some in losses. Some transactions involve securities purchased during the 
class period and sold afterwards, and some involve previously purchased 
securities that are sold during the class period. Which transactions should be 
taken into account in determining the extent of the plaintiff’s harm?245 
Some courts have held that the plaintiff’s recoverable damages should 
be measured by netting trading gains and losses.246 The Supreme Court in 
Randall, although rejecting the idea that the plaintiff’s tax benefits should 
be offset against rescissionary damages, suggested that such an offset would 
be proper when damages were based on out-of-pocket losses.247 Netting is 
also consistent with Dura’s statement that a plaintiff’s purchase at an 
artificially inflated price can be offset by a subsequent sale at the inflated 
price.248 This damage calculation views the plaintiff as obtaining a benefit 
from the sale that must be offset against the plaintiff’s initial loss. Until the 
stock price drops, the plaintiff can potentially receive this benefit. Only 
when the possibility of netting is lost has the plaintiff been injured. 
Other courts have rejected netting in favor of a transaction-by-
transaction analysis. For example, the court in Argent Classic Convertible 
Arbitrage Fund L.P. v. Rite Aid Corp. refused to aggregate multiple 
transactions, arguing that aggregation is both inconsistent with the statutory 
language and difficult to apply in a principled manner.249 To date, the issue 
remains unresolved. As the court stated in In re CIGNA Corp. Securities 
 
 244. A natural extension of this inquiry would require the court to consider whether a 
plaintiff’s net economic position has been affected by hedging, options positions, derivatives 
trading, etc. 
 245. Netting raises additional issues such as the method for determining the cost basis of 
the securities in question and whether holdings in separate accounts or funds should be 
aggregated. See In re CIGNA Corp. Sec. Litig., 459 F. Supp. 2d 338, 343–44 (E.D. Pa. 2006) 
(considering whether an institutional investor’s purchases of CIGNA stock in separate accounts 
managed by separate managers should be aggregated for the purpose of calculating the 
investor’s loss). 
 246. See, e.g., In re Comdisco Sec. Litig., 150 F. Supp. 2d 943, 945 (N.D. Ill. 2001) 
(describing the plaintiff’s transaction-based claim of losses as “a mirage”); see also In re eSpeed, 
Inc. Sec. Litig., 232 F.R.D. 95, 101 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (rejecting one lead plaintiff applicant in 
favor of another because the first applicant’s losses “were actually somewhat cushioned by the 
sales made when [the defendant’s] stock price was high”). 
 247. See Randall v. Loftsgaarden, 478 U.S. 647, 662–63 (1986) (distinguishing the rescission 
remedy from the attempt to calculate the plaintiff’s net economic harm). 
 248. Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 342 (2005). 
 249. See Argent Classic Convertible Arbitrage Fund L.P. v. Rite Aid Corp., 315 F. Supp. 2d 
666, 679–81 (E.D. Pa. 2004). 
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Litigation: “[T]here is nothing in Dura Pharmaceuticals that explicitly holds 
that (a) an investor who suffers damages from specifically identified 
transactions cannot recover losses from those transactions, or (b) that 
investor’s other trading in the company’s stock is relevant to a claim for 
damages based on the isolated transactions.”250 
Here again, traditional tort principles offer some guidance. Tort law 
typically does not net the plaintiff’s losses and benefits from wrongful 
conduct in determining recoverable damages. Tort theorists and 
philosophers have offered a variety of analytical approaches to explain this 
result. For example, commentators at a San Diego Law Review symposium 
discussed a hypothetical in which the plaintiff’s leg is broken as a result of 
the defendant’s negligence; because of the accident, the plaintiff fails to get 
on an airplane that subsequently crashes.251 The defendant’s negligence is a 
but-for cause of both the plaintiff’s harm—the broken leg—and the 
plaintiff’s benefit—the failure to die in the plane crash. Should a court net 
the harm against the benefit?252 
Although tort law generally does not net the harm and the benefit, or 
even consider evidence of the beneficial effects of the defendant’s tortious 
conduct, one might argue that it could do so as long as the relationship 
between the harm and the benefit was sufficiently close. In traditional tort 
terminology, one might argue that courts should net the benefit against the 
harm if the defendant’s conduct proximately caused the plaintiff’s 
benefit.253 In the airplane example, a court would likely find the airplane 
crash too far removed from the initial accident.254 In contrast, trading gains 
at the inflated price are closely related to the trading losses suffered by the 
plaintiff as a result of the misrepresentation. Thus, tort law offers a plausible 
argument in favor of evaluating the plaintiff’s economic loss by aggregating 
multiple transactions. 
 
 250. CIGNA, 459 F. Supp. 2d at 354. 
 251. One can imagine referring to the defendant’s conduct in this case as an example of an 
efficient tort, in the sense that it produces a net benefit for the plaintiff. 
 252. See Leo Katz, What to Compensate? Some Surprisingly Unappreciated Reasons Why the Problem 
Is So Hard, 40 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1345, 1347 (2003) (discussing counterfactual and causal 
approaches to the analysis); Stephen Perry, Harm, History, and Counterfactuals, 40 SAN DIEGO L. 
REV. 1283, 1312–13 (2003) (opining, based on the equities of the scenario, that there should be 
no offset, but admitting that “respectable argument[s]” support the opposite conclusion). 
 253. See Perry, supra note 252, at 1313 (“The [airplane hypothetical] is reminiscent . . . of 
the coincidence cases that arise under the rubric of proximate cause. . . . The coincidence rules 
out liability in such . . . case[s], and my sense is that it should similarly rule out offset in the case 
of the doomed airplane.”). 
 254. See id. (reaching this conclusion). Similarly, if the delay occasioned by the defendant’s 
conduct caused the plaintiff to take a later, crashing flight after missing his original, non-
crashing flight, courts would likely find that the plaintiff’s death was not a foreseeable 
consequence of the wrongful conduct and, therefore, that proximate cause was lacking. 
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V. CAUSATION AND FEDERAL SECURITIES FRAUD 
The foregoing analysis of harm has drawn heavily upon common law 
principles in the manner suggested by Dura but ignored by the majority of 
federal courts. This Article demonstrates that despite the claim that 
causation in securities fraud is modeled on common law tort principles, the 
lower courts have not been faithful to this claim and have either ignored or 
misapplied important common law guidance on the meaning of proximate 
cause, the role of intervening cause, and the legal effect of multiple or 
indeterminate causation. Despite Dura’s instruction, cases like Oscar move 
securities fraud further away from common law tort, at least with respect to 
causation analysis. At the same time, the analysis in Part III indicates that 
tort law is not a panacea; applying tort law principles is neither easy nor 
necessarily determinate. Indeed, an exploration of tort law suggests that 
Dura’s incorporation of tort law principles is somewhat disingenuous. 
Dura’s legacy regarding the requirement of economic harm is another 
failure. Although the lower courts, following Dura, now insist that a plaintiff 
allege “economic harm,” as the CIGNA court observed, subsequent rulings 
have failed to explain what that concept means.255 The result has been a 
series of conflicting and confusing cases untethered to an anchoring 
principle about the type of injury for which protection is warranted. 
Common law tort law offers tools for conceptualizing the harm, and Part IV 
considered different ways to define the harm in securities fraud litigation 
using these tools. The common law methodology demonstrates, however, 
that recoverable harm is a legal construct. Part IV identified several 
alternatives, but the choice among these alternatives depends on policy 
considerations and regulatory objectives. This Part now considers this choice 
in light of current policy debates about the proper role of private securities 
fraud litigation. 
A. SECURITIES FRAUD AND TORT LAW 
At first glance, the analogy to common law fraud and deceit suggested 
by Dura appears to work fairly well. Private litigation protects investors’ 
reliance interests by allowing them to recover when they have been misled 
by false information. A private right of action increases market efficiency by 
creating an incentive for investors to read federally mandated disclosures 
and by imposing liability on defendants who do not prepare those 
disclosures carefully. A damage remedy compensates investors not just for a 
decline in the value of their investments but also for the impairment of their 
investment decisions. Because investors are largely repeat players, 
interfering with their ability to research investments and rely on information 
 
 255. CIGNA, 459 F. Supp. 2d at 353 (“To date, no Court of Appeals has ruled on the impact 
of Dura Pharmaceuticals on the establishment of economic loss and damages for purposes of 
proof at trial.”). 
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disseminated into the marketplace creates a broader harm than that 
captured through a stock price decline. That harm is consistent with the 
broader measures of damages reflected in fraud law, including recovery for 
all foreseeable damages that were a factual result of the initial investment 
decision. The reliance requirement establishes the critical causal link 
between the defendant’s misconduct and these damages. Additionally, as in 
common law fraud, overdeterrence in securities fraud is not a significant 
concern because the wrongful conduct is intentional, not merely negligent. 
Structural considerations relating to the appropriate scope of judicial 
lawmaking also counsel in favor of drawing upon common law fraud. 
Although securities fraud is a statutory claim, it is an implied private right of 
action based upon a bare-bones statute that offers little guidance as to its 
appropriate scope or objectives. Determining the contours of the private 
right of action and fashioning the elements of the claim have been the work 
of the federal courts. Commentators have described this process as akin to 
common law lawmaking.256 Accordingly, tethering the scope of the claim to 
an established common law claim reduces the broad policymaking 
discretion of the federal courts and is consistent both with current 
approaches to statutory interpretation that seek to minimize such discretion 
and with Erie principles.257 
The Court’s decision in Basic critically changes this analysis. By 
eliminating the requirement that plaintiffs prove reliance on 
misrepresentations, Basic destroys the component of the transaction that 
would establish causation under common law fraud principles.258 The Basic 
presumption has the practical effect of eliminating the requirement of a 
causal relationship—at the purchasing stage—between the defendant’s 
conduct and any subsequent harm. The impairment of the investment 
decision that occurs in a traditional fraud context does not exist. 
Basic replaces reliance on the misrepresentations with reliance on the 
market price. Under the view articulated in Basic, plaintiffs are harmed not 
because they were misled into purchasing but because they purchased at the 
“wrong” price.259 The misinformation that the defendant imparted into the 
 
 256. See, e.g., Edward A. Fallone, Section 10(b) and the Vagaries of Federal Common Law: The 
Merits of Codifying the Private Cause of Action Under a Structuralist Approach, 1997 U. ILL. L. REV. 
71, 95 (describing the private right of action for federal securities fraud as “largely the product 
of ‘federal common law’”). 
 257. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) (rejecting the existence of a 
general federal common law). 
 258. See In re Merrill Lynch & Co. Research Reports Sec. Litig., 273 F. Supp. 2d 351, 363 
(S.D.N.Y. 2003) (distinguishing causation analysis in FOTM cases from causation analysis in 
cases involving face-to-face transactions and actual reliance), aff’d sub nom. Lentell v. Merrill 
Lynch & Co., 396 F.3d 161 (2d Cir. 2005). 
 259. See Donald C. Langevoort, Basic at Twenty: Rethinking Fraud-on-the-Market 7–10 
(Georgetown Univ. Law Ctr., Law & Econ. Research Series Paper No. 1026316, 2007), available 
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market distorted the market price and caused plaintiffs to overpay for the 
securities in question, but it did not directly affect their investment 
decisions. As Judge Sneed explained in Green v. Occidental Petroleum Corp.: 
The argument that but for the misrepresentation the stock would 
not have been purchased and that, as a consequence, all 
investment losses should be recoverable ignores the fact that the 
plaintiffs in this case relied not upon the misrepresentations 
themselves but merely on the assumption that the price of the 
stock was set by valid market conditions.260 
The key consequence of Basic is that it changes the nature of the 
plaintiff’s harm.261 The damage that the defendant causes in an FOTM 
scenario is not the disruption of investment decisions or the sacrifice of 
investor confidence in the accuracy of financial documents—it is a distortion 
of the market price.262 The defendant’s actions result in a stock price effect, 
not a purchasing decision. As a result, it is illogical to define the plaintiff’s 
harm in terms of a distorted decision or to measure harm by the 
consequences that flow from the purchasing decision. The only harm caused 
by the price distortion is the amount of the distortion; investors are buying 
at the “wrong” price. 
Indeed, the investors who recover under Basic are largely investors for 
whom the rationale of protecting investment decisions makes no sense. 
FOTM plaintiffs do not enhance market efficiency by reading disclosures 
and incorporating them into investment decisions. For many such investors, 
issuer-specific information is not only ignored, it is irrelevant to the 
investment decision. Index investors, for example, purchase on the basis 
that a stock is part of a particular index, not on an assessment of the quality 
of the investment or even on a judgment that the stock is currently trading 
at a fair price. For these investors, it is simply a matter of happenstance that 
the stock price turns out, in retrospect, to have been wrong. A securities 
 
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1026316 (offering various explanations of the connection between 
distortion of market price and investor reliance). 
 260. Green v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 541 F.2d 1335, 1343 n.3 (9th Cir. 1976) (Sneed, 
J., concurring in part and concurring in the result in part). 
 261. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 254 n.5 (1988) (White, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part) (criticizing the majority for declining to address the “difficult damages 
question” created by the Court’s acceptance of FOTM theory). 
 262. An alternative justification for the outcome in Basic is to conclude that the plaintiffs’ 
injury resulted from the fact that third parties—those who read the misrepresentations and 
relied upon them to affect market prices—were defrauded. But cf. Holmes v. Sec. Investor Prot. 
Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 268–69 (1992) (noting the historical rejection of this argument in 
analyzing proximate cause under the federal RICO statute). This justification may be consistent 
with market realities and, if extended, offers a basis for upholding liability in Stoneridge as well. It 
is not, however, consistent with either the language of the Basic decision or the scope of existing 
tort law. 
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fraud recovery amounts to a type of insurance for the fraud premium that 
the investors have paid. 
Under this analysis, the plaintiff’s recovery must necessarily be limited. 
At a minimum, recovery should be limited to the amount by which the price 
is distorted. FOTM leaves no room for expectation damages because the 
plaintiff had no expectation, or at least none that the fraud affected.263 
Similarly, no logical connection exists between the plaintiff’s initial 
overpayment and subsequent events that affect the value of the security. 
Because the plaintiff was not deceived into purchasing, Basic breaks the 
causal link between the fraud and subsequent stock price drops that are due 
to market and other forces. Finally, conceiving of securities fraud recoveries 
as a type of insurance offers a justification for limiting recovery to those who 
suffer a net loss and excluding those investors who realize an aggregate gain 
as well as transactions in which the stock price exceeds the initial purchase 
price. If a plaintiff’s overpayment is a matter of happenstance, there is no 
reason to ignore happenstance developments that reduce or eliminate the 
investment effect of that overpayment.264 
Importantly, however, these moves are justified in FOTM cases by the 
fact that we are no longer dealing with a cause of action and a resulting type 
of harm that are analogous to common law fraud. If Basic transformed 
securities fraud into a distinct statutory claim, with a different scope and 
different objectives, the rationale behind the common law analogy is not 
compelling. There is no reason to believe that common law principles can 
or should be transferred uncritically to the transactional context of the 
global securities markets.265 Similarly, the Basic transformation may not 
require a rejection of common law principles in traditional reliance-type 
securities fraud cases. Although these cases have largely been eclipsed by 
Basic and its progeny,266 some recent decisions have applied Dura principles 
 
 263. As Judge Sneed explained, all that the plaintiffs were ever entitled to was “a price set 
by valid market forces unrelated to the misrepresentations.” Green, 541 F.2d at 1343 n.3 (Sneed, 
J., concurring in part and concurring in the result in part). 
 264. Cf. Kenneth S. Abraham & Kyle D. Logue, The Genie and the Bottle: Collateral Sources 
Under the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 591, 601–06 (2003) 
(describing various methods of preventing overcompensation of tort victims who have 
insurance coverage). 
 265. But see Moore v. PaineWebber, Inc., 189 F.3d 165, 176 (2d Cir. 1999) (Calabresi, J., 
concurring) (examining the causation requirement in RICO fraud by analogizing to the 
destruction of cabbages on the way to market). 
 266. See McCabe v. Ernst & Young, LLP, 494 F.3d 418, 425 (3d Cir. 2007) (describing 
reliance-based, non-FOTM cases as “non-typical § 10(b) actions”). 
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of loss causation beyond the FOTM context.267 It is not clear that this 
approach is justified.268 
B. THE APPROPRIATE SCOPE OF THE STATUTORY FRAUD REMEDY 
As the Supreme Court observed in Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores: 
“[T]he typical fact situation in which the classic tort of misrepresentation 
and deceit evolved was light years away from the world of commercial 
transactions to which Rule 10b-5 is applicable.”269 The Schlick court itself—
the source of the causation requirement in federal securities fraud270—
explicitly distinguished the causation element from its tort law predecessor, 
observing that the statutory cause of action implicated distinct policy 
considerations.271 If common law fraud principles do not dictate how to 
resolve questions of causation and harm in the context of a 10b-5 claim, 
what factors should the courts consider? 
A starting point in this analysis is the extensive policy debate over the 
value of a private right of action for federal securities fraud.272 Most 
commentators identify the objectives of private securities fraud litigation as 
victim compensation and deterrence of wrongful conduct, objectives that 
are modeled on those of tort law.273 A substantial number of scholars, 
however, have questioned the extent to which private litigation is effective in 
achieving either goal.274 
 
 267. See id. at 433 (acknowledging that Dura is not controlling outside the FOTM context, 
but stating that “we believe the logic of Dura is persuasive”). 
 268. See, e.g., Livid Holdings Ltd. v. Salomon Smith Barney, Inc., 416 F.3d 940, 949 n.2 (9th 
Cir. 2005) (stating that “Dura is not controlling” in non-FOTM, reliance-based cases). 
 269. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 744–45 (1975). 
 270. See supra notes 15–22 and accompanying text (discussing Schlick). 
 271. Schlick v. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp., 507 F.2d 374, 383 (2d Cir. 1974). When 
appropriate, courts have recognized differences between the elements of federal securities 
fraud and those of the common law. The most commonly cited example is the elimination of 
the requirement of privity. See 4 ALAN R. BROMBERG & LEWIS D. LOWENFELS, BROMBERG AND 
LOWENFELS ON SECURITIES FRAUD & COMMODITIES FRAUD § 7:259, at 7-416 (2d ed. 2008) (“The 
common law requirement of privity has all but disappeared from 10b-5 proceedings.” (citation 
omitted)). 
 272. As then-Professor, and now-Judge, Guido Calabresi observed some years ago, 
formulating the scope of causation analysis depends critically upon identification of the “goals 
or functions” of the law. Calabresi, supra note 114, at 73 (describing cause as a “functional 
concept”). This Part considers causation in securities litigation within a similar functional 
context. 
 273. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Reforming the Securities Class Action: An Essay on Deterrence 
and Its Implementation, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1534, 1538 (2006) (“From a policy perspective, the 
securities class action has two potential rationales: compensation and deterrence.”); see also 
James D. Cox, Making Securities Fraud Class Actions Virtuous, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 497, 509–15 (1997) 
(defending securities fraud litigation as furthering both objectives). 
 274. See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 273, at 1545–56 (identifying failures to achieve either 
compensation or deterrence objectives); see also Jill E. Fisch, Class Action Reform, Qui Tam, and 
the Role of the Plaintiff, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1997, at 167, 174–75 (describing the 
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Although the arguments are too extensive to review in detail, 
commentators have argued that securities fraud litigation is ineffective in 
deterring wrongful conduct largely because, almost invariably, the damages 
are paid by the defendant corporation (and thus indirectly by its 
shareholders and insurance company) rather than by the individual 
corporate officials who made the fraudulent statements.275 The current 
structure of director and officer insurance policies,276 the corporate 
structure in which the knowledge and conduct associated with securities 
fraud may be spread among a number of officials, and the limited financial 
resources of corporate officials (compared to the corporation itself) make it 
very difficult to recover damages from individual wrongdoers. Moreover, 
when misstatements are made in connection with secondary market trading, 
the corporation does not benefit from the fraud and may even be a victim in 
the sense that corporate officers may manipulate financial reporting in 
order to increase their personal compensation or limit their accountability 
for poor corporate performance. 
Some scholars have gone further and argued that courts may not 
impose fraud sanctions accurately, leading to payouts in cases that do not 
involve misconduct while enabling some wrongdoers to escape liability.277 
To the extent that factors other than the merits—such as the size of the 
stock price drop or the company’s market capitalization—influence the 
likelihood of a lawsuit, the deterrent effect of litigation is further reduced. 
The courts have also expressed concern about the in terrorem effect of 
securities fraud class actions. The exposure to potentially large liability—or 
even significant litigation costs—may increase the pressure to settle weak 
cases.278  
 
trend to characterize deterrence, rather than compensation, as the primary objective of 
securities fraud litigation); Pritchard, supra note 37, at 945–47 (arguing that deterrence, rather 
than compensation, should be the primary goal of securities fraud litigation). 
 275. See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 273, at 1549–53 (describing who bears the costs of securities 
class actions). 
 276. See, e.g., Terrence G. Stolly, Comment, Scienter Under the Private Securities Litigation 
Reform Act of 1995: Unexpected Implications on Director and Officer Liability and D&O Insurance, 29 
CAP. U. L. REV. 545, 584–86 (2001) (describing how the fraud exclusion in many D&O policies 
makes it difficult to recover against corporate officials for securities fraud). 
 277. See, e.g., A.C. Pritchard, Stoneridge Investment Partners v. Scientific-Atlanta: The 
Political Economy of Securities Class Action Reform, 2007–2008 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 217, 225 (“Courts 
and jurors, with hindsight, may have difficulty distinguishing false statements (which were 
known to be false at the time) from unfortunate business decisions.”). 
 278. See, e.g., Janas v. McCracken (In re Silicon Graphics Inc. Sec. Litig.), 183 F.3d 970, 978 
(9th Cir. 1999) (noting that Congress enacted the PSLRA in part to prevent abusive securities 
fraud class actions designed “‘to impose costs so burdensome that it [was] often economical for 
the victimized party to settle’” (alteration in original) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 31 
(1995) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 730)). It is unclear whether this 
concern is warranted in light of the substantial barriers to litigation adopted by the PSLRA and 
decisions such as Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 127 S. Ct. 2499 (2007), Dura, and 
Stoneridge. 
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There is some empirical evidence supporting criticisms of the deterrent 
effect of private litigation. In particular, although scholars have found that 
corporate officers and directors suffer substantial reputational damage and 
other penalties associated with government enforcement actions for 
securities fraud, they have not found similar effects for private litigation.279 
Securities fraud litigation also presents a risk of overdeterrence, a risk 
that increases to the extent that settlement pressure and other factors 
reduce the accuracy with which sanctions are imposed. Although courts 
cannot impose liability unless the plaintiff proves scienter, the scienter 
requirement is substantially watered down from the common law 
requirement of intentional misconduct and often involves little more than 
gross negligence.280 As a result, common law fraud’s lack of concern for 
excessively deterring intentional misconduct is inapposite. Indeed, private 
litigation can deter corporate officials from disclosing information because 
of liability concerns. This chilling effect may reduce market efficiency. 
Commentators have questioned the compensation objective even more 
harshly. Here, there are two main arguments. First, securities fraud cases 
typically settle for a small percentage of the claimed damages.281 As a result, 
commentators argue that investors’ losses are largely uncompensated. The 
problem with this argument is that it does not address the question of what 
portion of the loss is compensable. If a recovery is compared to the gross 
amount of a stock price drop, it is likely to reflect only a portion of that 
drop. Under the reasoning discussed above, however, the full amount of the 
drop may not constitute recoverable harm. The second argument about 
 
 279. Compare Jonathan M. Karpoff et al., The Consequences to Managers for Financial 
Misrepresentation, 88 J. FIN. ECON. 193, 194 (2008) (reporting that 93% of officers and directors 
responsible for securities fraud lost their jobs, and describing other penalties suffered by 
culpable managers, including fines and criminal prosecution), with Eric Helland, Reputational 
Penalties and the Merits of Class-Action Securities Litigation, 49 J.L. & ECON. 365, 366 (2006) (finding 
little evidence that officers and directors suffer a reputational penalty from private litigation 
against their companies). 
 280. Courts have generally interpreted the scienter requirement to require some level of 
reckless conduct. See, e.g., Ottmann v. Hanger Orthopedic Group, Inc., 353 F.3d 338, 343 (4th 
Cir. 2003) (“[E]very circuit that has considered the issue has held that scienter may . . . be 
established by a showing of recklessness.”). Congress imposed a heightened pleading standard 
in the PSLRA. See Tellabs, 127 S. Ct. at 2509 (interpreting the requirement that the plaintiff 
allege facts supporting a “strong inference” of scienter). The PSLRA did not, however, address 
the scienter requirement itself. See id. at 2507 n.3 (“The question whether and when 
recklessness satisfies the scienter requirement is not presented in this case.”). 
 281. See, e.g., TODD FOSTER ET AL., RECENT TRENDS IN SHAREHOLDER CLASS ACTION 
LITIGATION: FILINGS STAY LOW AND AVERAGE SETTLEMENTS STAY HIGH—BUT ARE THESE TRENDS 
REVERSING? 12 (2007), available at http://www.nera.com/image/PUB_RecentTrends_Sep2007_ 
2color_web-FINAL.pdf (reporting that from 2002 through 2007, the annual median ratio of 
settlement to investor losses ranged from 2.1% to 3.0%). 
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compensation involves the “circularity problem.”282 Because damages are 
paid almost exclusively by issuers, current shareholders bear the cost.283 A 
diversified investor is as likely to be a current shareholder who pays as a 
former shareholder who recovers.284 Over time, the gains and losses from 
litigation should balance out, leaving diversified investors no better off than 
if the litigation had not occurred (and worse off after subtracting the 
transaction costs of litigation, including legal fees).285 Some commentators 
have further argued that, to the extent undiversified investors suffer 
disproportionately large losses, the law should not protect them from 
irrationally failing to protect themselves through diversification.286 
A partial answer to the circularity argument is the insurance analogy. To 
the extent that fraud recoveries function as a type of investor insurance, the 
goal is to spread losses among investors, and investors would expect to come 
out even, on the average. This Article argued in Part IV that Basic had the 
effect of shifting securities fraud recoveries from a tort-like remedy for 
misplaced reliance to a type of insurance or cost-spreading for transactions 
effected at a distorted price.287 The conception of Rule 10b-5 as an 
insurance scheme has been greeted with open hostility by courts and 
commentators.288 Yet, at the core, the unarticulated question over the extent 
to which an insurance-type scheme is warranted may be at the heart of the 
debate over private litigation. 
It is important here to distinguish between insurance for investment 
losses and insurance for losses resulting from fraud. No one is suggesting 
that investors should be able to recover under Rule 10b-5 for all securities 
losses. Indeed, the courts’ post-Basic expansion of the loss causation 
requirement might be seen as an effort to tailor appropriately the insurance 
 
 282. See Jill E. Fisch, Confronting the Circularity Problem in Private Securities Litigation, 2009 WIS. 
L. REV. (forthcoming 2009) (manuscript at 4, on file with the Iowa Law Review) (describing the 
“circularity problem”). 
 283. Id. 
 284. Id. 
 285. Id. 
 286. See, e.g., Richard A. Booth, The End of the Securities Fraud Class Action as We Know It, 4 
BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 1, 13 (2007) (“The law should presume that a reasonable investor is a 
diversified investor.”). 
 287. See, e.g., Calabresi, supra note 114, at 73–74 (identifying cost-spreading as a goal of tort 
law but arguing that “causal linkage is irrelevant to the spreading function of tort law”). This 
observation may, in part, have motivated the Court’s decision in Basic. 
 288. See, e.g., Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 252 (1988) (White, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part) (expressing concern that an irrebuttable presumption of reliance would 
“convert Rule 10b-5 into ‘a scheme of investor’s insurance’” (quoting Shores v. Sklar, 647 F.2d 
462, 469 n.5 (5th Cir. 1981))); Julie A. Herzog, Fraud Created the Market: An Unwise and 
Unwarranted Extension of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, 63 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 359, 362 (1995) 
(“Proof of reliance is necessary to avoid turning the rule into a ‘scheme of investor’s insurance’ 
or a mechanism for recovery of losses whenever an investment turns sour.” (footnote omitted) 
(quoting List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 463 (2d Cir. 1965))). 
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remedy provided by Basic. In order to prevent Rule 10b-5 from turning into 
an insurance system for market-based losses, those losses must be removed 
from the calculation of the plaintiff’s damages. Moreover, to the extent that 
an FOTM recovery is based on mispricing, investors presumably have priced 
the risk of nontortious causes of a price decline into their ex ante 
investment decisions. Compensating investors for the materialization of 
those risks amounts to a windfall. 
Whether a narrower type of insurance for fraud-based losses is desirable 
depends on several factors. First, a critical distinction between securities 
fraud and the harms commonly covered by insurance is that securities fraud 
produces, in every case, winners and losers. Investors who purchase at the 
inflated price suffer harms; investors who sell at the inflated price receive a 
windfall gain. When misinformation distorts the market, it may do so largely 
in an unbiased manner in the sense that individual investors are equally 
likely to win or lose from the presence of fraud in the market.289 If this is 
true, investors are unlikely to discount for the risk of fraud. This would 
undermine the argument that fraud inflicts a systematic harm on the market 
by increasing the cost of capital.290 Alternatively, it is possible that some 
investors may lose more frequently than others.291 Insiders may knowingly 
sell when the market price is inflated, as Ken Lay allegedly did in Enron.292 
Indexed investors, because of the manner in which they trade, may be more 
likely to purchase overvalued securities. The distribution of losses and gains 
is thus critical to assessing the social cost of securities fraud. 
This leads to the second factor. It would be helpful to know not just 
who loses money but also who recovers in securities fraud litigation and how 
much. The answer to this question requires an exploration of the claims 
administration process. Several private organizations currently administer 
securities fraud claims. After the court approves a settlement, the claims 
administrator, which is typically selected by plaintiffs’ counsel, notifies class 
members, receives and reviews claims, and pays out the settlement proceeds. 
Although claims administrators report to the court the aggregate 
amount of damages paid, the administration process is opaque. Claims 
administrators do not report or publicly release data concerning the 
percentage of claims that are accepted versus rejected, the breakdown of 
 
 289. See Marcel Kahan, Securities Laws and the Social Costs of “Inaccurate” Stock Prices, 41 DUKE 
L.J. 977, 1021 (1992). 
 290. See id. at 1017–21 (categorizing different types of stock price inaccuracies and arguing 
that the extent of “loss of liquidity” costs depends on the type of inaccuracy involved). 
 291. See id. at 1018 (describing how uninformed investors are at a disadvantage relative to 
investors who possess undisclosed information). 
 292. See Daniel T. Ostas, When Fraud Pays: Executive Self-Dealing and the Failure of Self-Restraint, 
44 AM. BUS. L.J. 571, 588–89 (2007) (describing allegations of a class action complaint that 
“twenty-nine Enron insiders consummated $1.1 billion in illegal trades . . . [by taking] 
advantage of artificially high stock prices caused, in part, by fraudulent financial reports” and 
that Ken Lay alone “cashed in for $101.3 million”). 
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claims among small and large investors, or even the mechanisms used to 
resolve issues like netting and the existence of multiple investor funds or 
accounts in determining the investors’ total loss. This data is critical for 
policymakers to debate meaningfully the value of fraud-based insurance as a 
mechanism for investor compensation. Similarly, this data should be 
evaluated in the context of meaningful information about investors’ 
recoverable losses. Because loss causation is now fully litigated at early stages 
of the case, both plaintiffs’ and defendants’ counsel obtain expert reports 
that calculate recoverable damages, attempt to eliminate other causal 
factors, and quantify the amount of fraud-based harm. Parties do not release 
these calculations to investors or the public, making it impossible to evaluate 
the investors’ actual recovery against their potential recovery on a per-share 
basis. Unless and until policymakers are able to determine who recovers and 
how much they recover, they cannot evaluate whether existing class actions 
provide meaningful compensation. 
A third factor to consider is the availability of alternatives. Institutional 
investors hold an increasingly significant percentage of U.S. equities, and 
these institutions—largely as a result of the PSLRA—have become active in 
securities fraud litigation. One of the consequences of this involvement has 
been the decision by some institutions to opt out of class actions in favor of 
pursuing individual claims.293 Opting out offers several advantages to an 
institutional investor. Although the settlement terms of most opt-out cases 
are confidential, media reports suggest that institutions sometimes recover 
more money and receive that money more quickly by opting out.294 
Individual claims are also not subject to many of the procedural barriers 
established by the PSLRA.295 
Policymakers must weigh two conflicting implications of the opt-out 
option. On the one hand, the ability of institutional investors to pursue 
individual claims reduces the deterrence justification for the Basic decision. 
 
 293. See, e.g., Stephen J. Choi & Jill E. Fisch, On Beyond CalPERS: Survey Evidence on the 
Developing Role of Public Pension Funds in Corporate Governance, 61 VAND. L. REV. 315, 331 tbl.3 
(2008) (reporting that 60% of public pension funds surveyed had opted out of representative 
securities litigation in favor of an individual action on at least one occasion); Keith L. Johnson, 
Opting Out of Class Actions, SEC. CLASS ACTION SERVICES ALERT, Jan. 2007, available at http:// 
www.reinhartinvestor.com/WebAdmin/Files/optingoutofclassactions.pdf (describing the opt-
out process). 
 294. See, e.g., Gilbert Chan, CalPERS’ Time Strategy Pays Off: The State Pension Fund Gets $117.7 
Million After Opting Out of Class-Action Suit Against Media Giant, SACRAMENTO BEE, Mar. 15, 2007, 
at D4 (reporting that by opting out, CalPERS received a recovery in Time Warner litigation that 
was seventeen times what it would have received by remaining as a member of the class action); 
Neil L. Selinger, Why Funds Opt Out of Class Action, PENSIONS & INVESTMENTS, Feb. 20, 2006, at 
12 (stating that opting out can lead to “substantial premiums over the class recovery” and “an 
expeditious payment”); Lorraine Woellert, Fractured Class Actions: “Opt-Outs” Are a Growing 
Headache for Companies, BUS. WK., Feb. 27, 2006, at 31 (noting recoveries by opt-out plaintiffs 
against Time Warner, WorldCom, and other big securities fraud defendants). 
 295. The provisions of the PSLRA apply to class actions. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(1) (2000). 
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If large investors can bring suit and recover substantial damages in strong 
cases of fraud, class actions are not necessary to assure accountability. 
Institutions’ large stakes will assure adequate damage claims to provide the 
necessary incentives for plaintiffs’ counsel, and if they do not, the use of a 
broader conception of harm can augment damages in reliance-based cases. 
Moreover, the availability of private individual litigation likely operates as a 
sufficient safeguard against the possibility that regulators will lack the 
funding or political will to undertake sufficient enforcement efforts. 
On the other hand, opting out may secure for institutions the majority 
of the recovery, reducing the potential compensation for retail investors 
even further. If sophisticated investors with large stakes pursue separate 
lawsuits, plaintiff classes will lose the benefit of the lead plaintiff provision, 
including the potential ability of active institutions to increase recoveries 
and reduce legal fees.296 Issuers will also become unwilling to agree to large 
settlements in class actions if they face substantial additional exposure in 
opt-out cases. Thus, if the practice of opting out becomes sufficiently 
widespread, it could threaten the viability of the class action mechanism. 
A stringent causation requirement exacerbates the problem. 
Institutional investors may not need the Basic presumption if they can prove 
reliance directly, and the extent to which Dura’s rigorous loss causation 
requirement applies in a reliance-based case is unclear. The result may well 
be a return to a pre-Basic world in which large investors can pursue 
individual securities fraud claims, and small investors are left without any 
recovery. Of course, the extent to which this constitutes a change from 
current practice is unclear. It may well be that small investors do not recover 
anything under current law due to the difficulties of submitting proof of 
their claim. Institutions, in contrast, are able to outsource the filing of their 
claims, making them more likely to recover.297 
A final consideration in the debate over fraud insurance is the extent to 
which the circularity claim is accurate.298 Although many commentators 
claim that a given investor is equally likely to pay or recover damages for 
securities fraud, in truth, the likely winners and losers are two distinct sets of 
investors. Securities fraud damages are recovered primarily by frequent 
traders, because it is necessary to purchase or sell securities in order to have 
 
 296. For statistics concerning the lead plaintiff provision and the involvement of 
institutional investors, see generally Stephen J. Choi et al., Do Institutions Matter? The Impact of the 
Lead Plaintiff Provision of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 869 (2005); 
James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, Does the Plaintiff Matter? An Empirical Analysis of Lead 
Plaintiffs in Securities Class Actions, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1587 (2006). 
 297. See Choi & Fisch, supra note 293, at 332–33 (describing the outsourcing of claims filing 
by public pension funds). 
 298. See, e.g., Fisch, supra note 282 (manuscript at 10–12) (arguing, in response to 
circularity arguments, that because reliance-based traders provide a positive governance 
externality, they should receive compensation for losses due to fraud). 
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standing under section 10(b).299 Frequent traders are less likely to pay 
damages because they have often sold their stock by the time the company is 
held accountable for the fraud. Holders, current shareholders in the 
company, pay securities fraud damages, and those holders are 
disproportionately buy-and-hold investors. If securities fraud recoveries 
largely transfer wealth from retail investors and retirement accounts to 
hedge funds, the preservation of a fraud-insurance remedy may appear less 
attractive. 
The foregoing discussion does not offer a complete solution. Instead, it 
demonstrates that the analysis of causation and damages for federal 
securities fraud must depend, in large part, on normative judgments. The 
factors identified above are among those that policymakers—legislators, 
regulators, or courts—should consider in determining the appropriate 
scope of the private right of action. As indicated, these judgments would also 
benefit from more complete data about current recoveries and payouts. 
What, then, is the lesson from tort law? The Dura Court was right in 
instructing courts to look to the common law, because the common law of 
torts reflects a long history of adapting legal requirements to reflect policy 
considerations. This history stretches from the “two fires” cases to Sindell and 
the lost-chance doctrine. But the Court in Stoneridge was also right to counsel 
caution in importing tort law’s requirements into Rule 10b-5 cases. 
Securities fraud and common law fraud differ, and to the extent that courts 
recognize and reinforce those differences, they enhance the ability of 
private litigation to address the demands of the global capital markets. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Causation analysis has become one of the most complicated aspects of 
private federal securities fraud litigation. The courts have struggled to 
fashion a causation requirement, demonstrating relatively little 
understanding of the goals of the causation inquiry and of the nature of the 
harm to which the inquiry should be addressed. Although the Supreme 
Court determined that lower courts should use tort law principles in 
formulating an approach to causation, to date, the lower courts have failed 
in their efforts to do so. The result is a series of decisions that are 
inconsistent, unfaithful to the common law, and largely incoherent. 
This Article traces the source of the problem to the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Basic. By moving away from traditional reliance to stock price 
distortion as a description of the plaintiff’s harm, Basic changed the nature 
of the private securities fraud claim. In particular, the Basic-generated 
statutory injury was a harm of potentially limitless proportions. 
 
 299. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2000) (prohibiting deception that occurs “in connection with 
the purchase or sale of any security”); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 
731–49 (1975) (recognizing this standing limitation). 
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The objectives of this statutory cause of action need not mirror those of 
traditional tort law, but to the extent that they do not, the scope of the claim 
must be tailored to address the underlying policy considerations. Identifying 
those policy considerations and formulating a conception of recoverable 
harm that accomplishes the desired objectives are approaches that the 
common law courts have applied in their development of tort law. It is this— 
and not tort law’s definition of proximate cause—that is common law’s 
lesson. In applying Dura, it is a mistake to look to common law cases 
involving squibs and cabbage carts. Although modern torts cases remain 
true to historic common law principles, they apply those principles in a 
context reflecting legal, policy, and scientific developments. To borrow from 
the common law, federal courts must incorporate these developments as 
well. 
 
